1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	SEAN M. KNEAFSEY (SBN 180863) JOYCE J. CHOI (SBN 256165) THE KNEAFSEY FIRM, INC. 800 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 710 Los Angeles, California 90017 Phone: (213) 892-1200 Fax: (213) 892-1208 JEREMY PASTERNAK (SBN 181618) LAW OFFICES OF JEREMY PASTERNAK A Professional Corporation 445 Bush St., Sixth Floor San Francisco, CA 94108 Phone: (415) 693-0300 Fax: (415) 693-0393	OCHPORMED COPY ORIGINAL FILED Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles APR 0 4 2017 Sharri R. Carter, Example Stricer/Clerk By:	
9	Attorneys for Plaintiff FE PALOMIQUE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
10	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES		
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12	FE PALOMIQUE, an individual,	Case No. BC 6 5 6 4 8 3	
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Plaintiff, vs. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS CLINICAL LABORATORIES, INC., a Delaware corporation dba QUEST DIAGNOSTICS; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendants.	COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FOR: 1. FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE DISABILITY (FEHA) 2. FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN THE GOOD FAITH INTERACTIVE PROCESS (FEHA) 3. DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY (FEHA) 4. RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF FEHA 5. WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY [DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL]	
2324252627	For its complaint against QUEST DIAGN Delaware corporation dba QUEST DIAGNOSTIC PALOMIQUE, an individual, alleges as follows:	OSTICS CLINICAL LABORATORIES, INC., a CS; and Does 1 through 50, Plaintiff FE	
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I. THE PARTIES

- Plaintiff Fe Palomique is an individual who is a resident of Los Angeles County,
 California.
- 2. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that Defendant Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc. is a Delaware corporation doing business as Quest Diagnostics ("Quest Diagnostics") that conducts business in and has a principal place of business in Los Angeles County, California.
- 3. The true names, capacities, and/or liabilities of DOES 1 through 50, inclusive (hereinafter "Does" or "Doe Defendants"), are unknown to Plaintiff at this time, and Plaintiff therefore sues said defendants by such fictitious names under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 474. After the true names, capacities, and/or liabilities of the Doe Defendants, or any of them, are ascertained, Plaintiff will amend this Complaint accordingly. Each of the Doe Defendants is liable to Plaintiff and is legally responsible in some manner for the events and happenings herein referred to, and caused injury and damages proximately thereby to Plaintiff.
- 4. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that at all relevant times herein, each of the Defendants, including DOES 1 through 50, inclusive (collectively "Defendants") directed, knew, or reasonably should have known of the acts and behavior alleged herein and the damages caused thereby, and by their actions and/or inaction directed, ratified, and encouraged such acts and behavior. Each of the Defendants was the agent, servant, and/or employee of each of the other Defendants, and was at all relevant times acting within the course and scope of their authority as such agents, servants, and/or employees, and with the consent of the other Defendants.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 5. Jurisdiction and venue are appropriate in this Court because, among other things, Plaintiff was employed in Los Angeles County. In addition, Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendant transacts business in Los Angeles County.
- 6. Plaintiff has filed, within one year of the wrongful acts alleged herein, "Complaint[s] of Discrimination Under The Provisions of The California Fair Employment and

Housing Act" with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") and Plaintiff has received from the DFEH her "Right to Sue" Notices and has therefore satisfied the administrative prerequisites for the timely bringing of this suit.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

- 7. Plaintiff Fe Palomique began her employment with Defendant Quest Diagnostics on or about May 20, 2013 as a "Clinical Laboratory Scientist II-Floater" at Defendant's Arcadia, California facility.
- 8. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant is a for-profit, private employer.
- 9. Plaintiff was hired to work the "evening shift," which lasted from 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 a.m. However, on or about November 4, 2013, Plaintiff was forced to work the graveyard shift until the end of 2013. Plaintiff was again forced to work the graveyard shift from April 27, 2014 through April 29, 2014. Plaintiff suffers from diabetes and hypertension. On the third day of her graveyard shifts, April 29, 2014, Plaintiff had to go to urgent care, who sent her to the emergency room, because she felt dizzy, and suffered from chest pains and shortness of breath. She was diagnosed with vertigo and informed that her blood sugar was abnormally high.
- 10. Plaintiff's primary care physician's office recommended that Plaintiff not work graveyard shifts in or about May 2014. Plaintiff's supervisor thereafter assigned extremely inconvenient back to back shifts at different facilities to Plaintiff and criticized Plaintiff and her work performance. Therefore, Plaintiff applied for the day shift position. Plaintiff's supervisor denied the application and stated that Plaintiff had to be transferred to another facility.
- 11. On August 19, 2014, Plaintiff learned that the company had posted two CLS-II job openings; one for the "second shift" (from 3:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m.) and one for the "third shift" (from 12:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m.).
- 12. On December 13, 2014, Plaintiff suffered a work-related injury and was placed on restricted duty.
- 13. On January 28, 2015, Plaintiff was informed that her position was being eliminated at the Arcadia facility and was told to apply for a position at the West Hills facility. Despite

management's claim that Plaintiff's position was being eliminated, two new employees holding the same position as Plaintiff had been hired in September and December of 2014.

- 14. Plaintiff went on a medical leave due to her injury from March 27, 2015 through July 19, 2015. She returned to work on July 20, 2015, but was told to go to the West Hills facility.
- 15. On or about July 31, 2015, Plaintiff was informed by her physician that she could not drive long distances due to her injuries, and was given a "Work Status Form" memorializing this restriction.
- 16. Plaintiff visited her physician's office again on August 28, 2015. A staff member who was evaluating Plaintiff informed her that someone had called the day before and had questioned the driving restriction. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that as a result of this call, the doctor filled out a "Work Status Form" purporting to lift Plaintiff's driving restriction (despite having recommended it only a month earlier, and despite there being no material change in Plaintiff's condition).
- 17. The following day, August 29, 2015, Plaintiff was instructed to work at the West Hills location beginning September 1, 2015. Of course, Ms. Palomique was not able to drive to the West Hills facility.
- 18. On September 14, 2015, Ms. Palomique discovered another job opening for a CLS-II in Arcadia with varying hours, despite the representations about her job having been eliminated.
- 19. On September 25, 2015, Plaintiff saw her physician again on her regular visit and was informed that the driving restriction had been removed because the insurance company case manager did not want the driving restriction any longer. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendant's worker's compensation insurance company adjustor/case manager requested her physician to remove the driving restriction.
- 20. Between September 30, 2015 and October 8, 2015, Plaintiff exchanged correspondence with Defendant's human resources department, and was told that they expected her to report to the West Hills office. Plaintiff sent responses to the effect she was working on getting a doctor's note. She asked if they really needed a doctor's note again since she had already sent one with a driving restriction. It was Plaintiff's belief and understanding that medically she

still was subject to the driving restriction, despite the one note to the contrary, and tried to explain this to human resources, and challenged the accuracy of the work status form which had released this restriction, as well as the circumstances under which it had been created. Despite this, management did not engage Plaintiff in a good faith interactive process to clear up the matter, and instead ignored it, moving directly to termination.

- 21. On or about October 9, 2015, Plaintiff was terminated.
- 22. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, as is further set forth herein, that Plaintiff was in fact denied an accommodation in the form of forcing her to drive to the West Hills facility despite the driving restriction ordered by her doctor, and terminating her employment because of her disability.
- 23. Despite efforts by Plaintiff to engage Defendant in a good faith interactive process regarding accommodation of her disability, Defendant refused to engage in such a process in good faith. Had Defendant engaged Plaintiff in a good faith interactive process, Plaintiff could have been accommodated and/or Defendant would have recognized that she did not actually need affirmative accommodation other than allowing her to continue working her normal shift at the same Arcadia facility she was working in.
- 24. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that she was discriminated against in the terms and conditions of her employment, as outlined herein, on the basis of her disability.
- 25. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that Plaintiff was retaliated against because she could not work the graveyard shift and could not drive to the West Hills facility. This retaliation included the false requirement that Plaintiff drive to the West Hills facility and termination of her employment.
- 26. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the termination of her employment was in violation of public policy. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that her termination was on account of her disability.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE DISABILITY IN VIOLATION OF THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT (Govt. Code § 12900, et seq.) (Against All Defendants)

- 27. The preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.
- 28. During the relevant time period herein, Plaintiff was "a qualified individual with a disability" within the meaning of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"). More particularly, Plaintiff had a physical impairment that substantially limited one or more of her major life activities, had a record of such an impairment, and was regarded as having such impairment. In addition, Plaintiff was an individual with a disability who, with reasonable accommodation, could have performed the essential functions of her position for Defendant.
- 29. Defendant was required to undertake a reasonable investigation of Plaintiff's request for an accommodation for her disability, and to continue to provide a reasonable accommodation for the known physical limitations of Plaintiff, but failed to do so. Such accommodation included but was not limited to making a determination not to terminate Plaintiff's employment and/or allowing her to continue her employment during her regular shift at the Arcadia facility she was working from.
- 30. Defendant was required to engage in a good faith interactive process to determine if Plaintiff's disability could be accommodated without undue hardship, but failed to do so.
- 31. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff was willing and able to perform the duties and functions of her position if such reasonable accommodation had been made by Defendant. At no such time would the performance of the employment position, with a reasonable accommodation for Plaintiff's disability, have been a danger to the health and safety of Plaintiff or any other person.
- 32. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct of Defendant, Plaintiff has suffered special damages, including but not limited to past and future loss of income, benefits, and other damages to be proven at the time of trial.
 - 33. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct of Defendant, Plaintiff has

suffered general damages including but not limited to shock, embarrassment, physical distress and injury, humiliation, emotional distress, stress, and other damages. The specific amount of these damages is currently unknown and to be proven at the time of trial.

- 34. The unlawful conduct alleged above was engaged in by the officers, directors, supervisors, and/or managing agents of Defendant who were acting at all times relevant to this Complaint within the scope and course of their employment. Defendant is therefore liable for the conduct of said agents and employees under the Doctrine of Strict Liability.
- 35. Defendant committed the acts herein alleged maliciously, fraudulently, and oppressively in conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights and such acts were committed by and/or ratified by, and/or were committed with the knowledge of the employee's lack of fitness in the workplace but were allowed to proceed, by officers, directors, and/or managing agents of Defendant. Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to recover punitive damages from Defendant in an amount according to proof at trial.
- 36. As a result of the conduct of Defendant, Plaintiff was forced to retain an attorney in order to protect her rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks the reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in this litigation in an amount according to proof at trial.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN THE GOOD FAITH INTERACTIVE PROCESS REGARDING ACCOMMODATION OF DISABILITY IN VIOLATION OF THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT (Govt. Code § 12900, et seq.)
(Against All Defendants)

- 37. The preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.
- 38. Plaintiff is "a qualified individual with a disability" within the meaning of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"). More particularly, Plaintiff had a physical impairment that substantially limited one or more of her major life activities, had a record of such an impairment, and/or was regarded by Defendant as having such an impairment. In addition, Plaintiff was an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, could have performed the essential functions of her employment position for

Defendant.

- 39. Defendant was required to engage in a good-faith interactive process with Plaintiff to determine if appropriate accommodations for Plaintiff's disability could be provided.

 Defendant failed to do so.
- 40. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff was willing and able to engage in a good faith interactive process and to perform the duties and functions of her employment position if such reasonable accommodation had been made by Defendant. At no such time would the performance of the employment position, with a reasonable accommodation for Plaintiff's disability, have been a danger to the health and safety of Plaintiff or any other person.
- 41. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct of Defendant, Plaintiff has suffered special damages including but not limited to past and future loss of income, benefits, and other damages. The specific amount of these damages is currently unknown and to be proven at the time of trial.
- 42. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct of Defendant, Plaintiff has suffered general damages including but not limited to shock, embarrassment, physical distress and injury, humiliation, emotional distress, stress, and other damages to be proven at the time of trial.
- 43. The unlawful conduct alleged above was engaged in by the officers, directors, supervisors, and/or managing agents of Defendant who were acting at all times relevant to this Complaint within the scope and course of their employment. Defendant is, therefore, liable for the conduct of said agents and employees under the Doctrine of Strict Liability.
- 44. Defendant committed the acts herein alleged maliciously, fraudulently, and oppressively in conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights and such acts were committed by and/or ratified by, and/or were committed with the knowledge of the employee's lack of fitness in the workplace but were allowed to proceed, by officers, directors, and/or managing agents of Defendant. Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to recover punitive damages from Defendant in an amount according to proof at trial.
- 45. As a result of the conduct of Defendant, Plaintiff was forced to retain an attorney in order to protect her rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks the reasonable attorney's fees and costs

incurred in this litigation in an amount according to proof at trial.

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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

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DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY IN VIOLATION OF THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT (Govt. Code § 12900, et seq.) (Against All Defendants)

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reference as though fully set forth herein.

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- 46. The preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are re-alleged and incorporated by
- 47. During the relevant time period herein, Plaintiff was "a qualified individual with a disability" within the meaning of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"). More particularly, Plaintiff had a physical impairment that substantially limited one or more of her major life activities, had a record of such an impairment, and was regarded by Defendant as having such impairment. In addition, Plaintiff was an individual with a disability who, with reasonable accommodation, could have performed the essential functions of her position for Defendant.
- 48. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that she was discriminated against in the terms and conditions of her employment, as outlined above, on the basis of her disability, as set forth herein, in violation of the FEHA.
- 49. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that Defendant willfully and/or with reckless indifference, violated California Government Code sections 12900, et seq., and discriminated against Plaintiff as outlined above, on the basis of her disability. Such discrimination has resulted in damage and injury to Plaintiff as alleged herein.
- 50. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct of Defendant, Plaintiff has suffered special damages, including but not limited to past and future loss of income, benefits, and other damages to be proven at the time of trial.
- 51. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct of Defendant, Plaintiff has suffered general damages, including but not limited to shock, embarrassment, emotional distress, stress, and other damages to be proven at the time of trial.
- 52. The unlawful conduct alleged above was engaged in by the officers, directors, supervisors, and/or managing agents of Defendant, who were acting at all times relevant to this

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Complaint within the scope and course of their employment. Defendant is, therefore, liable for the conduct of said agents and employees under the Doctrine of Strict Liability.

- 53. Defendant committed the acts herein alleged maliciously, fraudulently, and oppressively in conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights and such acts were committed by and/or ratified by, and/or were committed with the knowledge of the employee's lack of fitness in the workplace but were allowed to proceed, by officers, directors, and/or managing agents of Defendant. Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to recover punitive damages from Defendant in an amount according to proof at trial.
- 54. As a result of the conduct of Defendant, Plaintiff was forced to retain an attorney in order to protect her rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks the reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in this litigation in an amount according to proof at trial.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT (Govt. Code § 12900, et seq.) (Against All Defendants)

- The preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are re-alleged and incorporated by 55. reference as though fully set forth herein.
- 56. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that because she could not work the graveyard shift and could not drive to the West Hills facility, she was retaliated against in her employment. This retaliation included but was not limited to the termination of her employment with Defendant.
- 57. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant willfully and/or with reckless indifference, violated California Government Code Sections 12900, et seq., and retaliated against Plaintiff as outlined above, which has resulted in damage and injury to Plaintiff as alleged herein.
- 58. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered special damages, including but not limited to past and future loss of income, benefits, and other damages. The specific amount of these damages is currently unknown and to be proven at the time of trial.

- 59. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered general damages including but not limited to shock, embarrassment, physical distress and injury, humiliation, emotional distress, stress, and other damages to be proven at the time of trial.
- 60. The unlawful conduct alleged above was engaged in by the officers, directors, supervisors, and/or managing agents of Defendants who were acting at all times relevant to this Complaint within the scope and course of their employment. Defendant is therefore liable for the conduct of said agents and employees under the Doctrine of Strict Liability.
- 61. Defendant committed the acts herein alleged maliciously, fraudulently, and oppressively in conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights and such acts were committed by and/or ratified, and/or were committed with the knowledge of Plaintiff's lack of fitness in the workplace but were allowed to proceed, by officers, directors, and/or managing agents of Defendant. Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to recover punitive damages from Defendant in an amount according to proof at trial.
- 62. As a result of the conduct of Defendant, Plaintiff was forced to retain an attorney in order to protect her rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks the reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in this litigation in an amount according to proof at trial.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (Against All Defendants)

- 63. The preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.
- 64. At all times mentioned herein, California Government Code Section 12900, et seq., was in full force and effect, and set forth the policy of the State of California. The public policy of the State of California is, in part, to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek and hold employment without discrimination or abridgment on account of disability.
- 65. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that Defendant, by taking the actions as are set forth above, wrongfully terminated the employment of Plaintiff in violation of the public policy of the State of California as set forth herein.

- 66. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct of Defendant, Plaintiff has suffered special damages, including but not limited to past and future loss of income, benefits, and other damages. The specific amount of these damages is currently unknown and to be proven at the time of trial.
- 67. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct of Defendant, Plaintiff has suffered general damages, including but not limited to shock, embarrassment, humiliation, emotional distress, stress, and other damages to be proven at the time of trial.
- 68. The unlawful conduct alleged above was engaged in by the officers, directors, supervisors, and/or managing agents of Defendants who were acting at all times relevant to this Complaint within the scope and course of their employment. Defendant is therefore liable for the conduct of said agents and employees under the Doctrine of Strict Liability.
- 69. Defendant committed the acts herein alleged maliciously, fraudulently, and oppressively in conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights and such acts were committed by and/or ratified, and/or were committed with the knowledge of Plaintiff's lack of fitness in the workplace but were allowed to proceed, by officers, directors, and/or managing agents of Defendant. Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to recover punitive damages from Defendant in an amount according to proof at trial.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff makes the following demand:
For The First, Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action:

- a) That process be issued and served as provided by law, requiring Defendants to appear and answer or face judgment;
- b) That Plaintiff have and recover a judgment against Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial as special and/or actual damages;
- c) That Plaintiff have and recover a judgment against Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial as general damages;
- d) That Plaintiff have and recover a judgment against Defendants for punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial sufficient to punish, penalize and/or deter

Defendants and others: That Plaintiff have and recover a judgment against Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial for expenses of this litigation, including, but not limited to, reasonable That Plaintiff have and recover a judgment against Defendants for all prejudgment That Plaintiff have such other relief as this Court deems just and appropriate. That process be issued and served as provided by law, requiring Defendants to That Plaintiff have and recover a judgment against Defendants in an amount to be That Plaintiff have and recover a judgment against Defendants in an amount to be That Plaintiff have and recover a judgment against Defendants for punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial sufficient to punish, penalize and/or deter That Plaintiff have and recover a judgment against Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial for expenses of this litigation, including, but not limited to, reasonable costs of That Plaintiff have and recover a judgment against Defendants for all prejudgment That Plaintiff have such other relief as this Court deems just and appropriate.

Attorneys for Plaintiff FE PALOMIQUE

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury of any issue triable by right of a jury. DATED: April 4, 2017 THE KNEAFSEY FIRM, INC. Attorneys for Plaintiff FE PALOMIQUE