Criminal Procedure Outline – Spring 2004 - Carnahan

I. 4th Amendment: An Overview

  • “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, paper, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probably cause, supported by oath of affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
    • 4th Amendment only applies to the government, not private individuals

 

II. What is a Search?

  • A search happens when there is an infringement upon one’s reasonable expectation of privacy
  • The 4th Amendment protects people, not places
  • Katz Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
    • (1) That a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
    • (2) That the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable
  • Application of Katz
    • False-Friend
      • However strongly a defendant may trust an apparent colleague, his expectation in this respect are not protected by the 4th Amendment when it turns out the colleague is a government agent regularly communicating with the authorities
        • Policy: In these circumstances, no interest legitimately protected by the 4th Amendment is involved because the Amendment affords no protection to a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it
    • A person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties (i.e. in the phone numbers he dials)
    • A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another
  • Open Fields Doctrine
    • An open field falls outside the scope of the 4th Amendment’s Protection for two reasons:
      • (1) It is not a person, house, paper or effect, and
      • (2) A person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding activities occurring in open fields
      • These lands are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home, an office, or commercial structure would not be (i.e. can observe the lands from the air)

 

 

 

  • Curtilage
    • The area outside or adjacent to the home – the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of his life
    • Factors in Determining Curtilage:
      • (1) The proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage of the home
      • (2) Whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home
      • (3) The nature of the uses to which the area is put
      • (4) The steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by
    • A person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left outside the curtilage of a home for trash removal
  • Observation of a Home with Sense-Enhancing Technology
    • Constitutes a search where the technology is not in general public use

 

III. What is a Seizure?

  • A seizure of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property
  • Law enforcement may seize what they have probable cause to believe is criminal evidence
  • Categories of Seizable Items:
    • (1) Contraband – Evidence that may not lawfully be possessed by a private party
    • (2) Fruits of a crime
    • (3) Instrumentalities used in the commission of an offense (i.e. a weapon, a get away car)
    • (4) Mere evidence – An item of value to the police because it will help in the apprehension or conviction of a person for an offense (i.e. a blood stained shirt in a homicide investigation)

 

IV. The Substance of the 4th Amendment

  • Probable Cause
    • Searches and seizures must be supported by probable cause
    • A search of seizure that is conducted in the absence of probable cause ordinarily is unreasonable
    • Probable Cause to Arrest – Exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which they have reasonable trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed or is being committed by the person to be arrested
    • Probable Cause to Search - Exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which they have reasonable trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that evidence subject to seizure will be found in the place to be searched
    • Two Situations Where Probable Cause Arises
      • (1) The police may apply to a magistrate for an arrest warrant
      • (2) The police may conduct an arrest of search without a warrant

 

  • Application for Warrant – Probable Cause?
    • Probable cause must be determined by a neutral and detached magistrate
    • A magistrate must:
      • (1) Evaluate the truthfulness of the source of the information, and
      • (2) Evaluate the adequacy of the factual premises furnished by that source to support the validity of the source’s conclusion
    • Use of Information from Informants to Achieve Probable Cause
      • Aguilar-Spinelli Two Prong Test:
        • (1) Basis of knowledge (of informant)
        • (2) Veracity (examines the credibility and reliability of informant)
          • Credibility – When was the informant used before, how accurate was the prior information
          • Reliability – If independent corroboration turns out to show what the informant said was true
      • Totality of the Circumstances Test
      • When a police-affiant, under oath reports statements made by an informant, there are four possibilities regarding the truthfulness of the statements:
        • (1) The informant is lying, but the affiant neither knows nor has reason to know
        • (2) The informant is lying, and the affiant knows or should know
        • (3) The affiant is misrepresenting what the informant said
        • (4) The informant and affiant are both stating what they believe to be the truth
  • Challenging the Truthfulness of an Affiant in an Application for a Warrant – Franks Hearing
    • When a police-affiant, under oath reports statements made by an informant, there are four possibilities regarding the truthfulness of the statements:
      • (1) The informant is lying, but the affiant neither knows nor has reason to know
      • (2) The informant is lying, and the affiant knows or should know
      • (3) The affiant is misrepresenting what the informant said
      • (4) The informant and affiant are both stating what they believe to be the truth
    • The Franks Hearing
      • When a defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement (a) knowing or intentionally or (b) with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, the 4th requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request
      • In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by a preponderance of the evidence, and with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded
      • Even if the defendant can show the affiant committed perjury or acted with reckless disregard, the search or arrest is not per se suppressed (i.e. maybe only ½ of the statements in the affidavit are poisoned)
  • Arrest Warrants
    • Payton – An arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within – You have to have a warrant to go into a home even if you have probable cause
    • Warrantless Home Entry – Exigent Circumstances
      • A warrantless intrusion may be justified by the following exigent circumstances:
        • (1) Hot pursuit of a fleeing felon
          • Hot pursuit is effective if there has been an immediate or continuous pursuit of the suspect from the scene of the crime
        • (2) Eminent destruction of evidence
          • The rule is that while cops may have probable cause that drugs are located within a premises, that alone is not enough to trigger the exigency of imminent destruction
            • There must be more – rustling on the inside, or a toilet flushing
        • (3) The need to prevent the suspect’s escape
        • (4) The risk of danger to the police or other persons
      • Exception: Home Arrests for Minor Crimes
        • When the government’s interest is only to arrest for a minor offense (carries no possibility of jail time), the presumption of unreasonableness to warrantless home entries is difficult to rebut, and the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate
    • Warrantless Home Entry – The Murder Scene Non Exception
      • When the police come upon the scene of a homicide that may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises, and the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view – but a warrantless search must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation and once the premises have been secured for injured persons and possible searches, the purpose of such a search (care-taking function) has been fulfilled, and further searches, without further exigencies or a warrant, are unreasonable for the 4th
    • Arrests Made Outside the Home (With Probable Cause)
      • The police may, without a warrant, make an arrest for a felony in public places, whether the felony occurred in the officer’s presence or not, but an arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor may be made in a public place only if the misdemeanor was committed in the officer’s presence
    • Gerstein Hearings for Warrantless Arrests – Probable Cause Hearing
      • Requires that in a maximum of 48 hours, an arrestee who was arrested without an arrest warrant is entitled to a determination of probable cause by a magistrate – can be done ex parte
    • Executing an Arrest: Use of Force
      • An arrest, even one based on probable cause, constitutes an unreasonable seizure of the person if the method of making the arrest is unreasonable
      • An officer may not use deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon, unless she has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others
    • Arrests in a Third Persons Residence – The Steagald Principle
      • If the police are armed with a warrant to arrest a suspect, they may enter into a third person’s residence to arrest the suspect if they have probable cause to believe the suspect is within – but they cannot search the third person’s home on the basis of an arrest warrant for someone other than the homeowner unless a warrant to search that third person’s residence is obtained
  • Search Warrants
    • Two Approaches:
      • (1) Per Se – Insists that searches and seizures always require warrants
      • (2) Modified Per Se – A warrantless searched is per se unreasonable, but there are defined exceptions
    • Elements of a Valid Search Warrant
      • Warrants must be based on probable cause, supported by oath of affirmation from the officer, judged by a neutral and detached magistrate, and the warrant must be particularized (to the person/thing to be seized and/or the place to be searched)
      • Warrant Particularity Requirement Principles
        • (1) A relatively general description will be tolerated if the nature of the object to be seized could not realistically be described more specifically
        • (2) Greater generality is allowed in the case of contraband
        • (3) Greater generality is demanded if other objects of the same general classification are likely to be found at the search site (i.e cartons of women’s clothing will not do if the police will be searching a warehouse containing many of such cartons)
        • (4) Scrupulous exactitude is demanded when the search encroaches on 1st Amendment claims
    • Knock and Announce Rule
      • The 4th Amendment prohibition on searches and seizures contains an implicit knock and announce rule whereby police officers entering a dwelling much knock on the door and announce their identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry
      • Exception: The knock and announce rule is not required where the police have a reasonable suspicion that knocking an announcing their presence, under the circumstances
        • (1) Would be futile, a senseless ceremony
        • (2) Present a threat of physical violence
        • (3) That evidence most likely be destroyed if advance notice were given, or
        • (4) Where a prisoner escapes from the police and retreats to his dwelling
      • Must have Reasonable Suspicion – An officer must be able to articulate something more than a hunch; there must be some minimal level of justification; this is a less demanding standard than probable cause
      • Policies – A knock and announce rule serves to:
        • (1) Avoid unnecessary property damage
        • (2) Avoids injury to the police and inhabitants
        • (3) Preserves personal dignity, and
        • (4) Allows voluntary compliance with the law
      • NOTE: With knock an announce, the police already have a warrant, just must do so as a preliminary matter, but don’t have to knock if reasonable suspicion determines otherwise
      • COMPARED: To exigent circumstances exception, there is no need for a warrant to enter a home because it is an exception to the warrant requirement
    • In Anticipation of a Warrant
      • The police, upon probable cause, may seize a residence, building, or car without a warrant and refuse to allow the lawful owners of the premises access to the premises without some police supervision to ensure any evidence believed to be inside will be destroyed
      • STANDARD:
        • (1) The police must have probable cause to believe that the residence, building, or car contains evidence of a crime that may be seized (remember the four categories)
        • (2) Have good reason to fear that, unless restrained, the suspect would destroy the evidence before a warrant can be executed
        • (3) Make reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy (i.e can’t search the premises nor arrest the suspect before obtaining a warrant)
        • (4) Impose the restraint for a limited period of time no longer than reasonably necessary for the police, acting with due diligence, to obtain the warrant (there is no set time limit)
    • Executing a Warrant After Entry: The Scope of the Search of the Premises
      • Once officers are lawfully on the premises to execute a warrant:
        • (1) They may search containers large enough to hold the criminal evidence for which they are searching
        • (2) While officers execute a search warrant, they may seize an object not defined in the warrant, if they have probable cause to believe it is an item that may be seized
        • (3) Information that becomes available to officers immediately before or during the execution of a warrant may require them to cease or narrow their search, notwithstanding the dictates of the warrant
      • Cops May Make Reasonable Mistakes
        • As to the third element above, the exclusionary rule will apply to preclude the introduction of evidence obtained a mistaken search of the wrong premises, unless the mistake was reasonable
        • If the mistake was reasonable, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the warrant was otherwise valid
    • Searching Persons During the Execution of a Warrant
      • A warrant may authorize the search of a person, but it should be explicit; a warrant to search a home or other premises does not provide implicit authority to search persons found at the scene, even if the criminal evidence for which the police are looking might be found on them
      • Exception: The police must have independent probable cause to search the person, as well as some justification for conducting the search without a warrant (i.e. they must be able to point to an exception of the warrant requirement such as a search incident to arrest or a Terry pat down if the officers have reasonable suspicion)
    • Seizure of Persons During Warranted Searches
      • Although officers may not automatically search persons who are at the scene during the execution of a search warrant, the court has held that a warrant to search a place implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain (seize) the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted
  • When are Warrants Required? - Exceptions
    • (1) Exigent Circumstances
    • (2) Searches Incident to an Arrest
      • When a custodial arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person in order to remove any weapons that the arrestee might seek to use in order to resist the officer or effect his escape, and if it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction
      • The scope of this search extends to those areas that are within the arrestee’s grab area – the area within his immediate control, for weapons or evidentiary items whether the arrestee is cuffed or not
      • The search incident to arrest attaches automatically, and does not require a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion
      • Time Limitation: If the search is remote in time or place from the arrest, no exigencies exist, thus, the search incident to arrest must be contemporaneous to the arrest
      • NOTE: Different from Terry pat down, in that in a Terry pat down occurs without the suspect being arrested; it also is limited to a pat down of the outer clothing for weapons only
      • Extended: The search incident to arrest has been extended for officer safety to areas adjoining the room or hallway or area that could conceal another attacker
        • But there is no justification for routinely searching every room in the residence, or for searching through desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in the room itself – such searches, absent an exception, may be made only under the authority of a search warrant
    • (3) Arrest Inventories
      • After a defendant is taken into custody, he has to be transported to the station for booking, and typically undergoes a second search (after the incident to arrest) – an “arrest inventory,” if she will be incarcerated, even temporarily
      • This inventory search occurs without a warrant or probable cause
      • Justifications:
        • (1) To protect the arrestee from theft of her valuables
        • (2) To reduce the risk of false claims of theft by the arrestee
        • (3) To ensure that contraband and dangerous instrumentalities that might have been missed by the police in the initial search incident to arrest are not smuggled into the jail
    • (4) Search of a Car Incident to an Arrest of its Occupant
      • The courts have construed the “area within the immediate control of the arrestee” in a search incident to arrest to mean that when a cop has made a lawful custodial arrest of a “recent occupant” of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile, including an examination of any containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within the reach of the arrestee, so also will be containers, and such a container may be searched whether it is open or closed
      • NOTE: Difference from automobile exception, in that the search incident to arrest encompasses only the passenger compartment, and not the trunk – But if during the search of the interior of the car, the cop gains probable cause to believe there is criminal evidence in the trunk, the trunk may be searched under the automobile exception, and the rule is that if drugs are found in one compartment, then there is probable cause that there are drugs in other compartments for purposes of the automobile exception
    • No Searches Incident to Lawful Citation
      • When you are pulled over an cited, you are seized, but not taken into custodial arrest, thus, it is unreasonable under the 4th for an officer to conduct a search of the interior of the car because there is no “arrest” to justify a search incident thereto
      • Policy: A routine traffic stop is a brief encounter not triggering the exigencies to an incident to arrest; once the defendant is pulled over and a citation has been issued, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense has been obtained
      • Exception: Officers may simply arrest traffic violators, and search them incident to arrest, and the passenger compartment search incident to arrest also
        • Texas allows custodial arrests for seatbelt violations
    • Pretextual Stops and Arrests (Particularly in Automobiles)
      • Regardless of whether a cop subjectively believes that the occupants of an automobile may be engaging in some other illegal behavior, a traffic stop is permissible if based on probable cause and a reasonable officer in the same circumstances could have stopped the car for the suspected traffic violation
    • (5) The Automobile Exception (Not a search incident to arrest)
      • Automobiles and automobiles that are readily movable may be searched without a warrant in circumstances that would not justify the search without a warrant in a house or office, provided that there is probable cause to believe that the car contains articles entitled to be seized, and the scope of the search extends to the entire vehicle, not just the passenger compartment
      • Justification: Mobility of a car, reduced expectation of privacy stemming from a car’s use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of regulations
      • Scope: The probable cause must be aimed at the containers within the car, the scope is restricted to containers that may be able to physically contain the suspected evidence
      • Exception: In cases where the car is in a state of extreme immobility, the courts will not allow the automobile exception because in such circumstances, nothing impedes the police from posting an officer to the car and excluding person from it while a warrant is obtained
      • Parked Cars: If a car is parked but the officer has probable cause to search the car for criminal evidence, the courts have held that the car is readily mobile by the turn of the ignition, thus may search under the auto-exception; NOTE that the owner of the car does not necessarily have to be near the car while search conducted
      • Exception: Where a car is parked at home in the driveway and there is no chance the vehicle will be moved, and there is probable cause to believe the car contains criminal evidence, the police may post an officer to watch the car because under such circumstances, the justification for the automobile exception is not present as the car is not going to be moved (Coolidge was a plurality opinion, and restricted to its specific facts)
    • Automobile Exception and Motor Homes
      • When a motor home is being used on highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly for residential purposes, temporary or otherwise, the two justifications for the automobile exception come into play: (1) the vehicle is readily movable by the turn of an ignition key, and (2) there is a reduced expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle subject to policy regulations.
    • (6) Automobile Inventory
      • When vehicles are impounded, local police departments generally follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying the automobile’s contents (same policy reasons as an arrest inventory)
      • The inventory, however, must be made pursuant to, and not exceed the scope of, department established policies and procedures for inventory searches
    • (7) Containers in a Car
      • The automobile exception applies to justify a warrantless search of a vehicle that is supported by probable cause that the vehicle contains criminal evidence or that the criminal evidence is within a container that is located in a car.
    • (8) Containers Belonging to Passengers
      • Cops with probable cause to search a car may inspect any passenger’s belongings found in the car, not in the immediate physical possession of the passenger, that are capable of concealing the object of the search
      • Exception: If the police have no probable cause to suspect a passenger of criminal activity, and their containers are on their physical person, then the automobile exception does not apply
        • The police would be required to have new and independent probable cause to search a passenger and his belongings and must have an exception to the warrant requirement
    • (9) Plain View Doctrine
      • An officer may lawfully seize an search an article that is in plain view if:
        • (1) The cop viewed the article from a lawful vantage point (i.e. the officer had a lawful right to be where he was when he viewed the article)
        • (2) Immediately recognizable as contraband or seizable item
        • (3) A lawful right of access to the item
    • (10) Plain Touch Doctrine
      • If a cop lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy (same elements as plain view)
    • (11) Consent
      • An exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements
      • Prosecutor has the burden of a preponderance of the evidence that the consent was freely and voluntarily given, and not the product of duress or coercion, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force
      • Whether consent was voluntary requires an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances, including:
        • (1) Whether the subject knew he had a right to refuse consent
        • (2) Whether the police knew of the vulnerability of a particular subject and exploited it
        • (3) Evidence of minimal schooling and low intelligence
      • The government need not establish that the subject had knowledge of his right to refuse consent to establish effective consent because the right to refuse consent is not a constitutional right that must be waived (unlike Miranda)
      • Consent cannot be given when the subject merely acquiesced to a claim of lawful authority by the police
      • Consent may be withdrawn – the police must honor the citizen’s wishes, unless their pre-withdrawal search gives them independent grounds to proceed
      • A person can limit the temporal nature (“you may search for two minutes”) or the scope of the search (“you may search my kitchen, but not my bedroom”)

 

      • Scope of Consent
        • Scope of the search for the item includes containers that may bear that item, but not containers that physically could not
        • Under a general consent to search, it is unreasonable to destroy property in a search, even if, for example, a paper bag is stapled shut (unless granted specific consent to do so)
    • (12) Third Party Consent
      • Consent may be from third party who possessed common authority over, or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected
      • Third party consent must be voluntary
      • Common authority:
        • Rests on mutual use of the property by persons having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-habitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched
        • Standard: Objective standard
          • Would the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had actual authority over the premises (i.e. apparent authority)
    • The Terry Doctrine (Temporary Investigation)
      • Where a cop observes unusual conduct, the cop may, without probable cause, with reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot temporarily detain person for investigation, and with reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be armed and dangerous, make a limited search for weapons by a “pat down” of the outer clothing
      • Reasonable Suspicion: The cop must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together, with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the stop and frisk (it can’t be a mere “hunch”)
      • Scope: The scope is limited to a pat down of the suspect’s outer clothing for weapons
      • Policy: Protection of the police
      • If reasonably suspect that murder or other violent crime has occurred or is about to, that has been held as a per se reasonable suspicion to pat down
      • A Terry stop can occur after a crime has been committed
      • A person merely talking to drug dealers is not enough for reasonable suspicion for a pat down
      • Reasonable Suspicion – High Crime Area
        • Mere presence in an area known for high crime is not enough to support reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot
        • Unprovoked flight in a high crime area supports a finding of reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot and/or armed and dangerous
      • Terry De Facto Arrest
        • A custodial interrogation based merely on reasonable suspicion amounts to a de facto arrest and the scope of Terry has been violated
      • During a traffic stop, a cop may on reasonable suspicion of crime afoot order the driver out of the car and his passengers without additional justification, and if reasonable suspicion to frisk the driver, than may do so for the passenger without additional justification because of the dangerous situation (Remember, need articulable facts for reasonable suspicion – making an illegal turn is not enough)
      • Length of Detention
        • A Terry stop is reasonable in its scope in terms of duration if:
          • (1) The police diligently pursue a means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions, and
          • (2) The cop’s failure to recognize or pursue a less burdensome alternative means of investigation was not unreasonable under the circumstances
        • Exception: If the suspect consents to the length of the duration, than the time issue is obviated, unless she withdraws consent
  • Seizure of a Person for 4th Amendment
    • A person is seized under the 4th Amendment only when, by means of physical force or submission to an assertion of authority, the person’s freedom of movement is restrained, and under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would not believe that he was not free to leave
    • If defendant is seized before reasonable suspicion for Terry stop, the seizure is unreasonable under the 4th Amendment
    • Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure:
      • (1) Threatening presence of several officers
      • (2) Display of a weapon by an officer
      • (3) Some physical touching of the person of the citizen
      • (4) The use of language or tone of voice indicating compliance with request is likely compelled
    • Momentary Submission: A defendant’s momentary submission to a show of authority or physical contact, however brief, is enough for a seizure if reasonably would not feel free to leave
    • Remain for Independent Reasons: If the individual remains in his place for independent reasons (i.e. bus case where defendant wanted to ride the bus), the standard in such circumstances is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer’s requests or otherwise terminate the encounter
  • Extending the Terry Doctrine – Seizure of Personalty (Luggage/containers)
    • Terry allows a warrantless seizure of personalty (luggage) on the basis of  mere reasonable suspicion for the purpose of a limited investigation
    • Effect: When an officer’s observations lead him to reasonable believe that a traveler is carrying luggage that contains narcotics, Terry permits the officer to detain the luggage briefly to investigate the circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided the detention is properly limited in scope with respect to time and intrusion
    • Exception: The person whose luggage is detained is technically free to continue his travels or carry out other personal activities pending release of the luggage
  • Extending the Terry Doctrine – Pat Down of Interior of a Car
    • If a defendant is lawfully pulled over and the police gain reasonable suspicion, during the temporary investigation of the defendant that crime is afoot, and the defendant is armed and dangerous, and the car contains weapons, the officer may frisk the defendant, and passenger compartment of car for weapons including containers that may contain a weapon, and any evidence seized during that frisk of the car or person is admissible
    • NOTE: If the police in their pat down of the car find drugs in a container reasonable suspected of containing a weapon, this is probable cause for the automobile exception to search the rest of the car for more drugs, including the trunk.
  • Extending the Terry Doctrine – Terry Protective Sweeps Incident to an Arrest
    • If, during a lawful arrest of a defendant within his home, or the home of another, the cops gain a reasonable suspicion that the surrounding areas of the home pose a danger to the police, the cops, in addition to a search incident to an arrest of the person and the immediate areas of control of the defendant (which includes adjoining hallways and closets), may also conduct a “protective sweep,” a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person may be hiding or laying in wait, without a warrant, but the sweep must be diligently pursued to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger, and in any event it should take no longer than the time to complete the arrest and depart
    • Note: During a protective sweep, officers may encounter seizable items in plain view
    • Policy: For protection of police
  • The “Special Needs” Doctrine (Non-Criminal Context)
    • Some searches and seizures by the government must be conducted, and if probable cause or reasonable suspicion was required, it would frustrate the government’s “special need” to conduct the stop and search
    • Standard: “Special needs” search or seizure is triggered if the primary purpose for the stop or search is distinguishable from a general interest in law enforcement, and the court will look to the express purpose and the actual effect of the program in its determination
    • Administrative Searches
      • Building inspections
      • Heavily regulated industry searches
      • School searches
        • In school searches, there must be a reasonable suspicion that a policy or school rule has been violated
        • If reasonable suspicion is found, then may search (i.e. lockers) without probable cause or a warrant based on the same
      • Border searches
        • Policy: Primary purpose is not arresting and prosecution, but protecting the sovereign
        • Fixed border searches – Does not require any particularized suspicion
        • Roving border searches – Must have reasonable suspicion to stop a car near a border to search for illegal crossings
      • Police checkpoints (Sobriety checkpoints)
        • A sobriety checkpoint is constitutional if it passes a three-prong balancing test of the following factors:
          • (1) The state’s interest in conducting the checkpoint
            • The primary purpose must be a non law enforcement interest of protecting the public on the road and preventing property damage
          • (2) The effectiveness of checkpoints in achieving that goal, and
          • (3) The level of intrusion of an individual’s privacy caused by the checkpoints
            • To curb the discretion of police, there must be a department policy in place regarding the system of checking (i.e. every third driver checked)
        • Effect: No need for any particularized suspicion at all if these three are balanced in favor of the government, but to actually order a person out of the car, there must be at least a reasonable suspicion of DWI
        • Exception: Checkpoints for drug possession in automobiles have been held to have a primary purpose of law enforcement and require at least a reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle (if the roadblock’s express purpose was to prevent drug abuse and protect the public, may have a chance, but court will look to the effect of the program to gain the primary purpose)
        • Exception to Exception: There are circumstances that may justify a law enforcement checkpoint where the primary purpose is related to crime investigation, but an exigency is present (belief that an imminent terrorist attack, or catch a dangerous criminal)
      • Suspicion-less Drug Testing
        • Provided the primary purpose is distinguishable from the government’s general interest in law enforcement, drug testing may be conducted on a suspicion-less basis (i.e. certain companies, customs officials, high school athletes)
  • Standing to Assert 4th Amendment
    • For someone to have “standing” to assert his 4th Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, that person must show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy from the government’s search under circumstances
    • Effect: If the search was illegal, but the defendant does not have standing, then whether the search was lawful is no issue because defendant has no grounds for relief under the 4th Amendment (the legality of the search is a separate issue from standing)
    • Standing for Contesting Illegal Electronic Surveillance
      • A person has standing to contest electronic surveillance, and thus is entitled to suppression of unlawfully heard conversations, if:
        • (1) The government agents unlawfully overheard that person’s conversations that that person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in, regardless of where they occurred, or
        • (2) If the conversations occurred on that person’s premises, whether or not she was present or participated in the conversations
    • Ownership: A claim of ownership, control or dominion in the thing searched is not controlling, but will held make out an argument that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy
    • Overnight Guests: Overnight guests at another person’s residence with their consent have a reasonable expectation of privacy while in that person’s residence
      • Will not apply where there for commercial purposes, for the first time, and for a short duration
    • Passenger in Car: If merely riding as a passenger, then no expectation privacy to contest the search of the car (maybe if passenger claimed some ownership, control, or dominion over something in the car)
    • Exception Suppression Hearing Evidence: At a hearing on a motion to suppress, the defendant may admit ownership of the contraband seized – the prosecution is forbidden from using such evidence at trial if the defendant loses the suppression hearing, but it can be used to impeach the defendant
    • Note Plain View: Remember that plain view may come in to defeat a standing claim on the basis that a person generally has no reasonable expectation of privacy in objects left in plain view
  • Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
    • Civil Trials – Exclusionary rules does not apply to preclude use of illegally searched or seized evidence in civil trials
    • Grand Jury – Prosecutors may use evidence obtained in violation of 4th at grant jury proceedings
    • Impeachment Exception
    • Good Faith Exception – Evidence obtained by the police pursuant to a warrant subsequently held invalid will not be excluded if the police officer, in good faith, had grounds to objectively reasonably rely on the magistrate’s probable cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant issued
    • Exceptions to Exception: Suppression remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate in issuing the warrant was (1) misled by information in an affidavit that the cop knew was false or (2) would have known was false, but for his reckless disregard for the truth, (3) the magistrate abandoned his judicial role in being a neutral and detached judicial official, or (4) an officer does not manifest good faith by (a) relying on a warrant based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause to render belief in its existence entirely unreasonable, or (b) relying on a warrant that is so facially deficient
    • Exception Clerk’s Mistake: An officer may rely on a clerk
  • Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
    • Any evidence gathered as a result of a search or seizure in violation of the 4th Amendment, whether direct or derivative evidence, will be excluded
    • The “poison tree,” the illegal search must be identified and any evidence gathered as a result of the illegal search or seizure is the “fruit”
    • Applies to tangible and intangible evidence, such as conversations
  • Attenuation Doctrine – Exception to Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
    • When the connection between the illegal government act and evidence to be introduced has become so attenuated that the taint from the initial illegal act has dissipated, then the exclusionary rule will not apply to preclude the introduction of the evidence
    • Factors:
      • (1) The temporal proximity between the time of the illegal search or seizure and the time they obtain the evidence they seek to introduce
      • (2) Whether any significant events have intervened between illegality and acquisition of the evidence (consulting with counsel, new and distinct crime, Miranda is a factor, but not dispositive)
      • (3) The purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct
    • Quasi- Attenuation – Warrantless Home Arrest
      • Where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the State’s use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of the warrantless home arrests
    • Quasi-Attenuation – Fruit is a Witness
      • If a search or seizure is conducted in violation of the 4th, and the illegal search of seizure leads them to a witness, the exclusionary rule will rarely be applied based on the theory that the witness may come forward voluntarily
  • Independent Source Doctrine – Exception to Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
    • Even if the police seize evidence from an illegal search or seizure, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine will not apply if the police can show that an independent source of information led them to the evidence that would otherwise be fruit from an illegal search
  • Inevitable Discovery Doctrine – Exception to Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
    • Evidence may be admitted if it would (not could) “inevitably” have been discovered, in a short amount of time, in substantially the same condition, by other police techniques had it nor first been obtained as fruit of an illegal search or seizure
    • Evidence would inevitable have been discovered by lawful means
    • Compare: The distinction between independent source and inevitable discovery is that with independent source, the government starts out with legally obtained evidence and tries to make that showing, whereas with inevitable discovery, the government starts with illegally obtained evidence and must show than an exception applies

 

V. Confessions

  • Under the due process clause, confessions are inadmissible, unless voluntary
  • And a confession is not voluntary, but coerced where the defendant has so lost his freedom of action that the confession made was not his but the result of the deprivation of his free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer
  • Standard: Whether the government acted so as to overbear the defendant’s freewill, and the court will consider, under the totality of the circumstances:
    • (1) The characteristics of the suspect that bear on the suspect’s susceptibility to coercion
      • Such as education, immigrant, illiterate, mental illness, speaks English
      • Different characteristics may have higher thresholds depending on the suspect
      • Doesn’t matter whether the police know of the mental condition or not, unless they exploit it
    • (2) The process, procedure and nature of the interrogation
      • Such as duration of questioning, tenacity of interrogators, changing of interrogators, whether threats are made, immediate application of force, threats of future danger
    • (3) The morality of the officer’s conduct in the investigation
      • Such as using a childhood friend to play on the fears and weaknesses of the suspect, intentionally exploiting a suspect’s religion (i.e. sending a cop in as a priest)
      • Whether cops actions “shock the conscience”
    • Whether the cops acted in good faith or not is not of importance, where the elements are met and the defendant’s will is overborne, it’s an involuntary confession
    • Inherent Coercion: Physical coercion with beating, threats of physical coercion, questions for days with no rest
    • State action is required for a confession to be coerced
    • Necessity Defense for Coercion: Ticking time bomb (undecided issue)
  • Voluntary versus Reliability
    • If a confession is coerced from a defendant, but there is no state action, due process is not implicated, even if that confession is presented to the government and the prosecutor knew it was happening; but state law on evidence, or federal rules of evidence may prevent the confession from carrying any reliable value, even if probative, by effective cross-examination, and is a question of fact for the fact-finder (i.e. vigilante group beats confession from defendant and turns it over to prosecutor who acquiesces to the behavior)

 

VI. The 5th Amendment Privilege against Self-Incrimination

  • “No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
  • Miranda and the 5th Amendment
    • The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant, unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards to secure the privilege against self-incrimination
    • Procedural Safeguards:
      • (1)The suspect must be informed he has a right to remain silent;
      • (2) Anything he says can be used against him in a court of law;
      • (3) That he has a right to an attorney, even during questioning, and if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for him
    • Once the defendant has been read his rights, the police still can not interrogate the defendant unless they secure a waiver from the defendant, and silence is not a per se waiver; the burden is on the state to show that a proper waiver was secured
    • Proper Waiver: A defendant constitutionally waives his 5th Amendment right if he does so (1) voluntarily, (2) knowingly, and (3) intelligently
      • A defendant may waive his rights and has the liberty to change his mind and withdraw the waiver, and at that point, interrogation must cease
    • Policy: Police interrogation is inherently coercive
    • Exception: If the defendant is not in “custody,” and is not being “interrogated,” the police do not need to secure a waiver from a suspect to talk to him
    • The officer’s state of mind is irrelevant for Miranda regarding whether he intends at a certain point that he will or will not arrest a suspect
    • Not Crime Specific: Miranda is not crime specific; that is, once a suspect is in custody and is interrogated, Miranda must be complied with regardless if the defendant is interrogated per the crime he was arrested or, or for another crime he is suspected to have committed
  • “Custody” under Miranda
    • A person is in custody if he is deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way; if a reasonable person from the perception of the individual, would under the circumstances, not feel free to leave, that person is in custody
    • Roadside Custody: A defendant detained per a traffic study is in “custody” for Miranda if the defendant’s freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest (i.e. de facto arrest, infra)
    • Station Exception: Interrogation at police station, without more is not “custody;” fact intensive inequity
    • It doesn’t matter if the officers believe the defendant is free to leave, it is the defendant’s perception which is key
  • Miranda Interrogation
    • Miranda safeguards come into play when a person in custody is subjected to either express interrogation, or its functionally equivalent, which are, respectively, express questions or words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating testimonial response
    • Testimonial Limitation: A response is “testimonial,” whether in verbal or conduct form, if it is to be admitted to show a communication of thoughts
      • If the response is not “testimonial,” the 5th is not implicated, and Miranda warnings are not required
      • Real and physical evidence (i.e. results of a compelled blood test, DNA) is not testimonial
      • The results of a lie detector test are testimonial because they communicate thoughts
    • Exception – Witness Type Questions: A question of “what happened” or “did you see anything,” is more of a witness type question not designed to elicit an incriminating response
    • Exception – Booking Questions: Routing booking questions are not interrogative
    • Undercover/Jail Plant Exception: Even though a defendant is in custody when in jail, and even though a jail plant is questioning the defendant, by asking questions designed to elicit an incriminating response, Miranda is not triggered because the inherent coercive environment of a police interrogation in custody is not present
      • But if the defendant’s response is not “voluntary,” because the jail plant overbore the freewill of the defendant, then while the 5th Amendment is not triggered, due process is, and any inculpatory statements will be inadmissible
  • Waiver and Invocation of the Miranda Rights
    • A waiver of 5th Amendment rights under Miranda are effective if the defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his rights; and waiver can be express or implied by conduct, but silence alone is not waiver, and the prosecution has the burden to show waiver by a preponderance of the evidence
    • Standard for Voluntary: Determined from the totality of the circumstances, including (1) characteristics of the defendant, (2) the process or procedure used, and (3) the morality of the police conduct (infra)
    • Standard for Knowing and Intelligent: Whether defendant exhibits an understanding of the effect of his waiver (i.e. that his statements will be used against him)
    • Right to Remain Silent: If the accused invokes his right to remain silent, the interrogation must cease, and police must scrupulously honor the defendant’s right to remain silent
      • But the police may, after a reasonable time, initiate waiver with the defendant (Note: When a defendant invokes his right to counsel under Miranda, the police cannot speak with the defendant without his lawyer present)
    • Right to Counsel: If the accused invokes his right to counsel, the interrogation must cease and police cannot initiate waiver to further interrogate without counsel present; but defendant may initiate
      • Initiation of Waiver: Occurs when the cops or the defendant initiates communications relating, directly or indirectly, to the investigation (Cops can initiate waiver by reading defendant his rights again)
      • Invocation: The invocation of the right to counsel must be clear and unequivocal (but lower courts have construed “I think I want a lawyer” to be clear by striking the “I think.”)
    • The 5th Amendment privilege belongs to the defendant, not his attorney or another – Only the defendant may invoke the privilege
    • An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or counsel of usually strong proof of the validity of a waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver
    • Imputed: Once a defendant invokes his right to counsel, then, under Edwards, that invocation is imputed to all officers, everywhere, with a duty to inquire whether counsel has been invoked before initiating waiver
    • Even if there has been a break in custody after defendant invokes his right to counsel, Edwards forbids cop initiated waiver, but there is no set limit of time that may pass for Edwards not to apply to allow police initiated waiver
      • The standard is whether the police used the break in custody as a ploy only to arrest or otherwise put the defendant in custody for another crime, and read him his rights, which is in initiation of a waiver, to get around Edwards
  • Exceptions to Miranda
    • Impeachment: While statements made in violation of Miranda are inadmissible, they may be used to impeach a defendant if defendant takes the stand and begins to testify untruthfully
    • Witnesses: Statements taken in violation of Miranda that lead to a witness are inadmissible, but the witness may testify because witnesses are never suppressible fruits of a Miranda violation (infra)
    • No Fruit: Miranda does not have any fruit; therefore, evidence (usually confession statements) obtained directly from a breach of Miranda are not admissible, but if Miranda is subsequently properly given, and defendant waives, the statements then taken are not, as a matter of law, tainted by the earlier violation of Miranda (Note: Although Miranda warnings are not given, a confession may nonetheless be inadmissible if it violates Due Process)
    • Public Safety Exception
      • The need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and because Miranda has no fruit, any subsequent inculpatory responses or evidence found on that response are not suppressible, but once the exigency has dissipated, and defendant is in custody, interrogation cannot continue without Miranda
      • Exception: The cop’s motivation does not matter (as long as there is an exigency)
  • Miranda, Dickerson, and 18 U.S.C. §3501
    • Miranda is a safeguard for 5th Amendment, and states are constitutionally bound to afford the protections enumerated in Miranda
      • States are allowed to provide “something more” in a form other than Miranda, but that is so unlikely given how engrained Miranda has become in our society

 

VI. Police Interrogation - 6th Amendment Right to Counsel (Massiah)

  • The 6th Amendment right to counsel attaches upon formal charges brought against the defendant
    • Formal Charges: Grand jury indictment, preliminary hearing, information, arraignment
  • Therefore, a defendant has a right to counsel at every “critical stage” of the proceedings
    • Critical Stage: Anytime government and defendant meet about charges
    • Whether the stage is critical requiring the provision of counsel depends, upon an analysis whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in the confrontation and the ability of counsel to mitigate that prejudice
  • The defendant’s 6th Amendment right to counsel is violated if cops deliberately elicit incriminating information, regardless if defendant is in custody, from both direct and indirect surreptitious questions from the defendant without counsel present, if the defendant has invoked his rights and not waived
  • Once invoked, the police communicate to defendant through counsel
  • If defendant appears with counsel, the court automatically treats the defendant as invoking his rights (Note: Under the 5th, the right to counsel must be clearly and unequivocally invoked; thus, showing up with counsel may invoke the 6th, but not the 5th right to counsel)
  • Jail Plants/Undercover: Unlike Miranda, anytime the government, through whatever means, including jail plants and undercover officers, attempts to deliberately elicit incriminating information, unless counsel is present, 6th right to counsel is violated because it’s a critical stage (But if the cop merely overhears the defendant talking to a jail mate, not planted by the government, that is merely being a listening post, but not a deliberate solicitation)
  • The 6th Amendment Right to Counsel Has Fruit
    • If defendant’s 6th Amendment rights have attached, and defendant invokes his right to counsel, than all evidence discovered by reason of the cop’s deliberate elicitation of incriminating evidence without counsel present is tainted from the violation
    • Exceptions: Because Massiah has fruit of the poison tree doctrine, all of its exceptions apply – (a) attenuation, (b) independent source doctrine, and (c) inevitable discovery doctrine (Although statement is suppressed because Massiah violated, may be used to impeach)
  • Waiver of the 6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Jackson Rule
    • Once the 6th right to counsel is invoked, police cannot initiate waiver from the defendant without counsel present, but defendant may initiate a waiver (must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent), and a waiver for the 6th is effectuated after the defendant waives his rights after Miranda
    • Effect: Once right to 6th counsel has been attached and invoked, any subsequent waiver during a police-initiated custodial interview without counsel is ineffective
  • The 6th Amendment is Crime Specific
    • Once the 6th has attached and invoked, only the defendant may initiate waiver, and the police cannot initiate waiver without counsel present as to the crime the defendant is formally charged with, and crimes that are the “same offense”
      • “Same Offense” – Determined by looking to the elements of the crime actually charged with; if the offense charged proves the elements of a lesser included offense, than that lesser included offense is the “same offense”

VII. Entrapment

  • If defendant proves entrapment, he is entitled to be acquitted of an offense or have the charge against her dismissed; a finding of entrapment does not than result in exclusion of evidence at trial – it necessarily bars the successful prosecution of defendant
  • Entrapment is not a constitutional doctrine
  • There is an objective and subjective test for entrapment – as to state law, there is a split on which one applies – but the US Supreme Court has adopted the subjective test
    • NOTE: Whether case is being brought in federal or state court to see which test applied
  • Subjective Test of Entrapment
    • Where government has induced an individual to break the law and the defense of entrapment is at issue -  the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by the government agents
      • Proof of pre-disposition must be independent of government acts
    • Policy: The government may not originate a criminal design, implant in an innocent person’s mind the disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induce the commission of the crime so that the government may prosecute
    • Danger: If the defendant raises entrapment in federal court, to prove the subjective test, the defendant must admit he committed the crime and his entire history of bad acts and character evidence comes into evidence
    • The subjective test is a question of fact for the fact-finder
    • A disposition to do something legal that is now illegal is not enough – must show a predisposition to commit an act that is illegal now
    • A defendant’s readily behavior to commit the crime is strong proof for predisposition
    • Some persons are so situated by prior occupation, or training that their predisposition is not hard to prove (i.e. public official in position to take bribes, a gun dealer will engage in illegal gun sales)
  • Objective Test for Entrapment
    • Focuses solely upon the nature of the police activity
    • Under this test, the defendant proves entrapment if the police activity was reasonably likely to cause an innocent (un-predisposed) person to commit the crime; the defendant’s own innocence or predisposition is irrelevant
    • Objective test is a question of law for the judge to decide
  • Due Process Entrapment: Even if defendant cannot show entrapment under objective or subjective test, may still be able to show due process violated if the government’s conduct “shocked the conscience”

 

VIII. Eyewitness Identification Procedures

  • An in-court identification is admissible into evidence, even though an out-of-court identification took place in violation of the defendant’s 6th right to counsel, if the prosecution, pursuant to a hearing, can rebut the presumption of tainted fruit, by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has a recollection independent of the out-of-court identification to make the in-court identification, and the court will consider the following factors for an independent source:
    • (1) The prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act
    • (2) The existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant’s actual description
    • (3) Any identification prior to lineup of another person
    • (4) Identification by picture of the defendant on a prior occasion
    • (5) Failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion
    • (6) Lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification
  • Where the defendant, post-indictment, is put in a lineup, without counsel present – This is a critical stage of the proceedings because substantial prejudice can visit the defendant without his counsel there to prepare a cross-examination based on the conduct of the identification procedure
  • The 6th Amendment argument is that the identification proceeding was in violation of the defendant’s right to counsel because it is an effort to deliberately elicit incriminating evidence regarding the defendant, without counsel present – And because there is fruit to Messiah, the in-court identification is tainted fruit
  • Exception: If the out-of-court identification is in violation of Messiah it is suppressed and there is no opportunity to show an independent recollection by clear and convincing evidence
  • Exception: If the witness/victim knows the victim, not matter how prejudicial the out-of-court identification is, then very likely to show an independent origin for in-court, but out-of-court still suppressed if in violation of 6th right to counsel
  • Exception: This rule does not apply to non-corporeal identifications (i.e. after formal charge if merely shown a picture, that is prejudicial, but the argument that counsel cannot prepare a cross-examination is not present, and thus not a critical stage for the need of counsel)
  • Exception: There is no 5th Amendment privilege to being in a lineup because it is not testimonial
  • Due Process Violations in Identification Procedures
    • If an identification takes place that would otherwise be unconstitutional under the 6th Amendment, but it is not, because there is no formal charges yet filed, the defendant may exclude an out-of-court identification if, from the totality of the circumstance, the identification procedure was so unnecessarily suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, but if the identification is reliable, the identification is not in violation of due process
    • Biggers Factors for Reliability
      • (1) The opportunity of the witness to view the criminal act at the time of the crime
      • (2) The witness’ degree of attention
      • (3) The accuracy of a prior description of the criminal
      • (4) The level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation
      • (5) The time between the crime and the confrontation
        • Against these factors is to be weighted the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself
    • Exigencies should be considered to balance against the suggestive nature of the procedure (i.e. if victim was near death and the only witness to the act)

 

IX. Pre-Trial Release – 8th Amendment Bail Clause

  • Federal law unequivocally provides that a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail, and the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to reasonably assure the presence of that specific defendant’s presence at trial
    • If an individual is not given this individualized consideration, and bail is set arbitrarily, or otherwise, the bail is excessive under the 8th Amendment
  • The 8th Amendment excessive bail clause has NOT been incorporated through the 14th Amendment to be a fundamental right and the reason is that all states have bail hearing statutes
  • Bail Reform Act
    • Presumption to Release on Recognizance or Unsecured Bond
      • There is a statutory presumption, that a defendant shall be released on his own recognizance or unsecured bond subject to the condition that the defendant not commit a crime, unless the judge determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person or will endanger the safety of any other person of the community
    • Preventive Detention (Holding over until trial)
      • Pretrial detention must be predicated on the government’s proving, by a preponderance, the satisfaction of at least one of the six categories enumerated
        • The first three categories are based on the nature of the charge (including violence)
        • The fourth on the nature of the offense and defendant’s prior record
        • Final two are based on whether there is a (a) serious risk that the defendant will either flee or (b) obstruct justice or threaten a prospective witness or juror
      • If the government proves one of the six categories by a preponderance, than pretrial detention is available upon a judicial finding of clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person and the safety of the community
      • Government presents evidence at the detention hearing by proffer, which allows evidence in form of affidavits, live witnesses, and FRE don’t apply
      • Exception Capital Cases: Most jurisdictions provide no bail for capital cases because of the natural tendency to not be put to death or jail forever
      • Bail for Indigents: If truly indigent and cannot afford bail, there is a scant argument to be made under equal protection; the counter-argument is must a judge then provide non-monetary conditions to release with no bail for indigents but not for others

 

    • Due Process Argument Against Laws Providing for Preventive Detention
      • For the Bail Reform Act, or any other law that provides for preventive detention, to withstand a substantive due process attack, the government had to show that the statute is not punitive, but regulatory, and the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment; unless Congress expressly intended to impose punitive restrictions, the punitive/regulatory distinction turn on whether the mechanics of the statute are:
        • (1) Rationally connected to an alternate purpose, other than punishment (such as protecting persons and the community), and
        • (2) Whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to is (whether there are procedural protections in place for the defendant, and the safety of defendant while held over)

 

X. Case Screening

  • Constitutional Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Charging
    • Prosecutors are given wide discretion in charging offense, but a prosecutor is not obliged to charge for every offense the evidence supports, and must never prosecute if they themselves have a reasonable doubt regarding the crime, even if the evidence objectively may prove beyond a reasonable doubt
    • Selective Prosecution
      • Must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the prosecutorial policy at issue had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose
        • To show a discriminatory effect, the defendant must show that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted
        • This is to get discovery
      • Presumption that DA did not engage in selective prosecution
    • Prosecutorial Vindictiveness (Due Process Issue – Penalizing Defendant Exercising Right to Appeal)
      • When a criminal defendant is subjected to a greater punishment by the prosecutor’s filing of greater charges or harsher sentencing on the same conduct for the original charge, such a penalty for pursuing the defendant’s right to appeal or collateral attack of his conviction violates due process
      • Exception: The prosecutor may up the charge post-conviction and post defendant’s appeal if the state can show that it was impossible to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset
  • Judicial Screening of Cases: The Preliminary Hearing (Fed R. Crim. P. 5.1)
    • The preliminary hearing is not required because the prosecutor may seek an indictment directly from a grand jury, but the purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether an offense has been committed and, if so, whether there is probable cause for charging with the offense
      • If the magistrate finds there is probable cause for charging, the defendant must either be incarcerated or admitted to bail, and if probable cause not found, the defendant is released
        • The preliminary hearing is a “critical stage” for 6th Amendment right of counsel to attach (Messiah)
      • If the prosecution gets an indictment from the grand jury before the preliminary hearing is set, it eviscerates the preliminary hearing
      • Exception: States are not constitutionally required to provide either a preliminary hearing or grand jury indictment; thus states may bring defendant to trial on official oath that probable cause exists
      • Preliminary hearing evidence may not be used at trial, except to impeach
  • Grand Jury Screening of Cases
    • Operates in secrecy
    • Prosecutor does not need leave of court to seek a grand jury indictment
    • Swears in its own witnesses
    • Grand jury does not have the following rights:
      • Double jeopardy clause does not bar a GJ from returning an indictment when a prior GJ has refused to do so
      • 6th Amendment right to counsel does not attach when an individual is summoned to appear before a GJ
      • 4th Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply in GJ proceedings
      • Hearsay rule is not enforced in GJ proceedings
      • The prosecutor is not required to present exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence because even if presented, the GJ is not required to consider exculpatory evidence
    • GJ cannot compel the appearance of a witness and the production of evidence, and must appeal to the court when such compulsion is required
    • GJ is not allowed to override constitutional protections or testimonial privileges, such as the privilege against self-incrimination
    • GJ right is NOT incorporated to the states, but most states have GJ system set up; the GJ is seen as an arm of the prosecution
    • Two Roles:
      • (1) As a sword – The GJ is an investigative body on whether there is probable cause that a crime has been committed
      • (2) As a shield – Can be used to keep executive from harassing citizens on less than probable cause
    • For federal government, if there is direct evidence that completely negates the offense, the prosecutor must withdraw the charges
    • Usually 23 members, but may indict if 12 concur, even if 23 there
    • May serve for 18 months, and can get an extension of up to 6 months after that to be 24 months on a serving
    • Harmless error standard applied on appeal on GJ error

 

  • The 5th Amendment Privilege
    • Provides that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
    • It need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that to a witness there is reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer to claim 5th amendment, and while the danger of imaginary and unsubstantial character will not suffice, the court has never held that the privilege is unavailable to those who claim innocence, because one of the 5th Amendment’s basic functions is to protect innocent men
    • If granted immunity to testify, the witness on direct should be asked whether she was so granted because otherwise the defendant may impeach on the grounds that she was so given in return for testimony
    • But while defendant may cross a witness to so impeach the witness, it is not prejudice to the defendant that she is given immunity because she may in fact cross to impeach for bias
  • The effect of the GJ Investigative Function, the 4th Amendment, and the 5th Privilege
    • Transactional Immunity – A total blanket from prosecution for all offenses relating to the testimony, directly or indirectly
    • Use (and derivative use) immunity – Bars the use of the testimony directly or indirectly (i.e. if testimony leads to other evidence of other crimes) to prosecute the witness; but with use immunity the witness can still be prosecuted with independently obtained evidence gathered from a source other than the testimony and the derivatives of that testimony
  • Production of Documents as Testimonial
    • If a witness is compelled to produce documents or tangible things in a trial or to the GJ, that act of producing is testimonial in the sense that it is an implicit testimonial opinion that the thing or documents exist, that the witness knew of their location, and that government description is true, and the defendant may invoke the 5th not to produce, unless the prosecution grants her immunity, or shows that it can confirm the location, existence, and description of the documents or things produced through sources independent of the witness
    • While the GJ may compel production without individualized suspicion, the request must be reasonable in scope (i.e. the production cannot be too sweeping, otherwise it’s a violation of the 4th Amendment)
  • Pretrial Motion Practice (Fed. R Crim. P. 12)
    • There are permissive and mandatory pretrial motions (must bring both before trial)
    • The motion to suppress is the most common
    • Use of Pretrial Testimony
      • Nothing in the pretrial hearing can be used against the defendant at trial on the merits, but can be used to impeach
    • Motion to Change Venue
      • 6th Amendment claim to right to impartial jury
      • The right to an impartial jury under the 6th Amendment has been interpreted to mean a right to impartial trial in the judicial district where the crime occurred, and under Rule 21, there are two grounds to satisfy to transfer venue:
        • (1) That there is so great a prejudice in the district of suit
        • (2) That the defendant is unable to obtain an impartial trial
    • Discovery Rules (Fed. R. Crim. P. 16)
      • The government must produce (as to defendant’s own statements) on request from the defendant
        • (1) Defendant’s own written or recorded oral statement made to anybody (but not persons other than the defendant)
        • (2) Any written or recording containing an oral statement of defendant that was made to a government agent in response to interrogation reduced to writing (must know it’s a government agent)
        • (3) Substance of any oral statement made by defendant to a government agent in response to interrogation if government intends to use at trial not reduced to writing yet (know it’s an agent)
        • (4) Defendant’s own GJ testimony
      • A defendant may discover the results of a physical or mental examination, and if material the government must disclose
      • The government will not produce witness lists because of the fear of witness tampering
      • Under the Janks Act, after the government has held a direct examination of the of the witness, because defendant must be able to confront witnesses against him, defendant may request a recess and be given time to construct a cross-examination with all documents and statements that witness has made
  • Constitutional Discovery – Prosecutor’s Duty on Exculpatory Evidence
    • Exculpatory evidence material to guilt or sentencing must be disclosed and the prosecutor has an independent duty to disclose such evidence in the absence of a request, and if the prosecutor does not so disclose, the defendant’s due process rights have been violated for a fair trial, and is entitled to a new trial
    • Standard for Material (Brady Material):
      • Exculpatory evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed, it would have changed the outcome of the case
      • It doesn’t matter that it’s a specific or a general request for all exculpatory evidence, the prosecution must disclose, even if it’s a vague request
      • The duty to disclose by the prosecutor is a continuing duty to disclose for evidence that they come about that is exculpatory
  • Bad Faith Destruction or Non-Preservation of Evidence by Police
    • Unless a defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process, for a fair trial
    • Effect: If bad faith, and intentionally destroy evidence, denial of due process and new trial
    • Exception: Absent bad faith, the cops do not have an affirmative duty to preserve evidence; therefore, negligence on the part of cops in preservation and collection of evidence not violation
  • Duty of Counsel to Disclose Alibi Witnesses – 5th Amendment Privilege
    • In many jurisdictions, for defendant to utilize an alibi defense, the defendant must notify the prosecution and disclose the witnesses the defendant plans to use to prove up an alibi, in order to give the prosecution an opportunity to prepare a rebuttal with its own witnesses – this requirement does not violate the 5th Amendment privilege because defendant is not required to use an alibi defense
  • Joinder and Severance (Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a), 8(b))
    • Joinder of Claims
      • The indictment or information may charge a defendant in separate counts with two or more offenses if the offenses charged – whether felony or misdemeanor – are of the:
        • (1) Same or similar character, or
        • (2) Are based on the same act or transaction, or
        • (3) Are connected with or constitute part of a common plan or scheme
      • Joinder of Defendants in the Same Indictment
        • The indictment may charge two or more defendants if they are alleged to have:
          • (1) Participated in the same act or transaction, or
          • (2) In the same series of acts or transactions
      • Exception: If the defendant can show prejudice of joinder of claims or defendants, the court may order a severance because the prosecutor is not mandated to join all defendants in one count, it is permissive
  • Speedy Trial (6th, Due Process, Federal Statute)
    • In order for a defendant to prove a violation of his right to a speedy trial under the 6th, the court will consider the following factors:
      • (1) The length of the delay
      • (2) The reason for the delay
      • (3) The defendant’s assertion of his right (did he object), and
      • (4) Prejudice to the defendant (spend much time in jail?)
    • The right to speedy trial attaches on formal charges being brought, and if this right is violated, the defendant’s remedy is a dismissal with prejudice
    • The Due Process guarantee of a fair trial prevents prosecutors from delaying formal charges in bad faith to secure a tactical advantage that prejudices the defendant – The remedy is dismissal with prejudice
    • Federal Speedy Trial (cannot be waived) – In general, trial must begin within 30-70 days after indictment, subject to exceptions
      • The remedy is in the discretion of the court to dismiss with or without prejudice
  • The Fundamental Right to Counsel – Capital Cases Under Due Process
    • In a capital case, where the defendant is indigent and is incapable of making his own defense, the due process clause imposes a duty upon trial courts to appoint counsel whether requested or not, and that duty is not discharged unless enough time is given for the defendant and counsel to prepare a meaningful defense
  • The Fundamental Right to Counsel – Non-Capital Cases
    • The 6th Amendment right to counsel is a fundamental right for due process incorporation to the states for both capital and non-capital felony cases, and the state has the burden to provide such counsel
  • Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases
    • A criminal has a 6th Amendment right to counsel in misdemeanor cases if the defendant will actually be imprisoned, not whether imprisonment is authorized; therefore, the court must project whether imprisonment is an option, and if so, counsel must be appointed
    • Counsel must be appointed if defendant is to receive a suspended sentence, and serve probation and restitution, because if a condition is not met, defendant goes to jail (same for deferred adjudication)
  • Right to Counsel on First Appeal
    • An indigent defendant is entitled to counsel for his first appeal regardless of whether an attorney would be of much benefit in the eyes of the appellate court
    • This is not a 6th Amendment right, but a Due Process right
    • Exception Discretionary Appeals: An indigent defendant has no due process or 6th Amendment right to counsel for discretionary appeals (In Texas, this would be to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, except in death penalty cases; US Supreme Court is discretionary)
  • The Right to Waive Counsel – Right to Self-Representation
    • A defendant may waive his right to counsel if he does so voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, and a defendant knowingly and intelligently waives his right to counsel if the defendant is properly made aware in a Faretta hearing the right to counsel and the dangers of self-representation
    • The right to self-representation is implied from the 6th Amendment’s right to assistance of counsel
    • Technical knowledge of the rules or law and procedure are not required for a knowing and intelligent waiver, but a defendant must abide by the rules
    • Reserved Right to Stop Pro Se and Appoint Stand By Counsel
      • The judge may terminate self-representation for misconduct, and if need to may appoint stand-by counsel over objection of defendant
      • But defendant is entitled to control over his case, and standby counsel cannot destroy the jury’s perception that defendant is representing himself (i.e. standby counsel giving opening or closing or objecting)
      • Remedy for violation of self-representation is reversal and new trial
      • No right to claim ineffective assistance of counsel if self-represent
      • Grounds for appeal are whether the judge properly advised the defendant of dangers of self-representation (i.e. that his waiver was not voluntary and knowing)
      • Exception Appeal: Defendant has no right to self-representation on appeal
  • Competency to Decide Whether to Waive Counsel and Plead Guilty
    • Whether the defendant has a rational understanding of the proceedings against him and is able to assist counsel in his representation (same for pleading guilty, representing himself, stand trial)
  • The 6th Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel – Strickland
    • A criminal defendant is entitled to reasonable effective assistance of counsel, and for a convicted defendant to make out an ineffective assistance claim against counsel to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence, defendant must prove two elements:
      • (1) Counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
      • (2) Defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, and but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability, from the totality of the evidence (including what came in and what didn’t) that the defendant would not have been convicted, or with regard to sentencing that the defendant would have received a lighter sentence
    • Exception: Courts will not presume a strategy when counsel limits his investigation
  • Actual and Constructive Denial of Counsel as Ineffective Assistance – Presumed Prejudice
    • If defendant can show that he was actually or constructively denied counsel, prejudice is presumed triggering automatic reversal and new trial
    • Actual: Where defendant is literally kept from being appointed counsel
    • Constructive: Where counsel is appointed, but denied access to help prepare his defense, or lawyer was sleeping
  • Actual Conflict of Interest as Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    • If there is a possible conflict of interest hindering the performance of counsel,
      • (1) And there is objection made about the counsel,
        • The court must hold a hearing and if the court finds that there is no conflict of interest, than on appeal the trial court’s findings are given deference – if the court finds a conflict, counsel must withdraw and new counsel must be appointed
        • If the court does not hold a hearing on the conflict, prejudice is presumed and automatic reversal and new trial
      • (2) And there is no objection made about the conflict, prejudice is presumed and defendant is entitled to reversal and a new trial if defendant can show:
        • There was an actual conflict of interest, and that conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance as to that defendant’s defense
  • Plea Bargaining (Fed. R. Crim. P. 11)
    • A plea is valid if defendant is competent to plead guilty and the plea is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
      • There must be a factual basis for the plea if the defendant insists he is innocent but pleads guilty anyways
    • A plea is not involuntary if inducement is avoiding the death penalty
    • Defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, reserving in writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination on a specified pre-trial motion.  A defendant who prevails on appeal may then withdraw the plea.
    • The court shall have no hand in structuring the plea bargain
    • Once plea bargain is reached, the defendant cannot withdraw from the plea merely because the court does not take the recommendation of the prosecution
    • Defendant may withdraw from a plea before the court accepts the plea, for any reason; but once the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence, the defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty if the court refuses the plea bargain, or can show a fair and just reason to withdraw the plea
    • Once plea is accepted and the court imposes sentence, the defendant may not withdraw a plea of guilty, and the plea may be set aside only on direct appeal or collateral attack
    • Fast track pleas are constitutional
    • Factual Basis for the Plea
      • The court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea, but there is no constitutional requirement that the court or the record, reflect a factual basis of defendant’s guilt
      • If the defendant maintains innocence, the court, in its inquiry of whether the plea is voluntary, knowing and intelligent must subjectively determine a factual basis to accept the plea, but a hearing is not required
      • A judge need not believe the defendant’s guilt to accept a plea
  • Making and Breaking Deals
    • A defendant is denied due process if a prosecutor does not honor his plea agreement
    • The due process clause is not a code of ethics for the prosecutor
    • Proof of actual vindictive prosecutorial plea bargaining is a violation of due process
      • If a prosecutor threatens to bring a charge that is legally permitted to bring, this is not vindictive prosecutorial behavior
  • Right to Jury Trial – 6th Amendment
    • A defendant is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial if the crime charged is serious, but not if the crime is petty
      • Serious crime provides for incarceration for more than 6 months, or if the fines are so severe that reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question is serious
      • Petty crime is one with incarceration up to and including 6 months (you cannot aggregate time amongst petty crimes, even if they exceed six months collectively)
    • We look to the time authorized, not what the defendant actually received
    • A defendant may waive his right to a jury trial with approval of court and the consent of the government
    • Defendant has a right to a public trial, but not a private trial
    • Federal system requires a 12 man jury; state criminal defendants do not have a constitutional requirement to a 12 man jury; in fact, a 6 man jury is constitutionally allowed in non capital cases, but 5 is too small
    • Federal system requires unanimous verdicts; states are not constitutionally bound to do the same; the Supreme Court has indicated that a positive vote of 9 is as low as they will go – with 6 person juries, they must be unanimous
    • States do not have to give a jury trial in every single criminal prosecution
  • Jury Selection & 6th Amendment Right to Impartial Jury
    • A defendant is entitled to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community
      • Defendant does not have a right to a fair cross section within the final panel that actually adjudicates his case, but is entitled to a fair cross section of the community that makes up the jury pool
    • Standard for a Cross Section Violation:
      • A distinctive group in the community was excluded resulting in disproportionate representation in the venire by a systematic exclusion
        • A distinctive group is defined and limited by some factor that a common thread or basic similarity in attitude, ideas, or experience runs through the group, and there is a community of interests among the members of the group such that the group’s interest cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process
    • Voir Dire
      • A defendant may inquire into racial bias in jury selection if:
        • Ham Standard: The defendant has a due process right that binds the states to allow a defendant to inquire into racial bias in jury selection if racial issues are inextricably bound up in the case, or
        • Federal Supervisory Prong (applies only to federal system) – The defendant may inquire into racial bias in jury selection if there is a reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice might influence the jury (i.e. typical case is an interracial crime of violence)
        • Capital Cases (Constitutional/binds states) – There is a right for the defendant to inform the jury pool of the race of the victim and inquire into racial bias
      • Strikes for Cause
        • There is no limit on how many jurors can be struck for cause
        • Two Types:
          • (1) The juror is not qualified (can’t speak English, not citizens, felon)
          • (2) The juror is biased
            • The court must make an inquiry whether the individual juror, notwithstanding their bias, can still do their job
        • Per se bias cannot be implied by membership in an organization
        • Even if a juror is morally opposed to the death penalty, that is not per se bias if they can still do their job
      • Peremptory Strikes
        • Each side is allotted a limited number of peremptory strikes to exclude a juror for whatever reason other than race or gender
          • If a juror is excluded for race or gender, the defendant will most likely bring an equal protection claim
    • Equal Protection Claims in Jury Selection Strikes
      • Defendant must:
        • Raise an inference of discrimination (show facts and circumstances, i.e. prosecutor struck all blacks) upon which
        • The prosecutor will come forward with a race neutral explanation (i.e. bad feeling, looked at me wrong), and upon that, the
        • Judge must decide whether prosecutor’s explanation is legitimate or merely a pretext for discrimination