Criminal Procedure Outline – Spring 2004 - Carnahan
I. 4th
Amendment: An Overview
- “The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, paper, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probably cause, supported
by oath of affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
- 4th
Amendment only applies to the government, not private individuals
II. What is a Search?
- A search
happens when there is an infringement upon one’s reasonable expectation of
privacy
- The 4th
Amendment protects people, not places
- Katz Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy Test
- (1)
That a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
- (2)
That the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable
- Application
of Katz
- False-Friend
- However
strongly a defendant may trust an apparent colleague, his expectation in
this respect are not protected by the 4th Amendment when it
turns out the colleague is a government agent regularly communicating
with the authorities
- Policy:
In these circumstances, no interest legitimately protected by the 4th
Amendment is involved because the Amendment affords no protection to a
wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily
confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it
- A
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties (i.e. in the phone numbers he
dials)
- A
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another
- Open
Fields Doctrine
- An
open field falls outside the scope of the 4th Amendment’s
Protection for two reasons:
- (1)
It is not a person, house, paper or effect, and
- (2)
A person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
activities occurring in open fields
- These
lands are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home,
an office, or commercial structure would not be (i.e. can observe the
lands from the air)
- Curtilage
- The
area outside or adjacent to the home – the area to which extends the
intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the
privacies of his life
- Factors
in Determining Curtilage:
- (1)
The proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage of the home
- (2)
Whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home
- (3)
The nature of the uses to which the area is put
- (4)
The steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by
people passing by
- A
person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left
outside the curtilage of a home for trash removal
- Observation
of a Home with Sense-Enhancing Technology
- Constitutes
a search where the technology is not in general public use
III. What is a
Seizure?
- A
seizure of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with
an individual’s possessory interests in that property
- Law
enforcement may seize what they have probable cause to believe is criminal
evidence
- Categories
of Seizable Items:
- (1)
Contraband – Evidence that may not lawfully be possessed by a private
party
- (2)
Fruits of a crime
- (3)
Instrumentalities used in the commission of an offense (i.e. a weapon, a
get away car)
- (4)
Mere evidence – An item of value to the police because it will help in
the apprehension or conviction of a person for an offense (i.e. a blood
stained shirt in a homicide investigation)
IV. The Substance of
the 4th Amendment
- Probable
Cause
- Searches
and seizures must be supported by probable cause
- A
search of seizure that is conducted in the absence of probable cause
ordinarily is unreasonable
- Probable
Cause to Arrest – Exists where the facts and circumstances within the
officer’s knowledge and of which they have reasonable trustworthy
information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that an
offense has been committed or is being committed by the person to be
arrested
- Probable
Cause to Search - Exists where the facts and circumstances within the
officer’s knowledge and of which they have reasonable trustworthy
information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that evidence
subject to seizure will be found in the place to be searched
- Two
Situations Where Probable Cause Arises
- (1)
The police may apply to a magistrate for an arrest warrant
- (2)
The police may conduct an arrest of search without a warrant
- Application
for Warrant – Probable Cause?
- Probable
cause must be determined by a neutral and detached magistrate
- A
magistrate must:
- (1)
Evaluate the truthfulness of the source of the information, and
- (2)
Evaluate the adequacy of the factual premises furnished by that source
to support the validity of the source’s conclusion
- Use of
Information from Informants to Achieve Probable Cause
- Aguilar-Spinelli Two Prong Test:
- (1)
Basis of knowledge (of informant)
- (2)
Veracity (examines the credibility and reliability of informant)
- Credibility
– When was the informant used before, how accurate was the prior
information
- Reliability
– If independent corroboration turns out to show what the informant
said was true
- Totality
of the Circumstances Test
- When
a police-affiant, under oath reports statements made by an informant,
there are four possibilities regarding the truthfulness of the
statements:
- (1)
The informant is lying, but the affiant neither knows nor has reason to
know
- (2)
The informant is lying, and the affiant knows or should know
- (3)
The affiant is misrepresenting what the informant said
- (4)
The informant and affiant are both stating what they believe to be the
truth
- Challenging
the Truthfulness of an Affiant in an Application for a Warrant – Franks Hearing
- When
a police-affiant, under oath reports statements made by an informant,
there are four possibilities regarding the truthfulness of the
statements:
- (1)
The informant is lying, but the affiant neither knows nor has reason to
know
- (2)
The informant is lying, and the affiant knows or should know
- (3)
The affiant is misrepresenting what the informant said
- (4)
The informant and affiant are both stating what they believe to be the
truth
- The Franks Hearing
- When
a defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false
statement (a) knowing or intentionally or (b) with reckless disregard
for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, the
4th requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s
request
- In
the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless
disregard is established by a preponderance of the evidence, and with
the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s
remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the
warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded
- Even
if the defendant can show the affiant committed perjury or acted with
reckless disregard, the search or arrest is not per se suppressed (i.e.
maybe only ½ of the statements in the affidavit are poisoned)
- Arrest
Warrants
- Payton – An arrest warrant founded
on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to
enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to
believe the suspect is within – You have to have a warrant to go into a
home even if you have probable cause
- Warrantless
Home Entry – Exigent Circumstances
- A
warrantless intrusion may be justified by the following exigent
circumstances:
- (1)
Hot pursuit of a fleeing felon
- Hot
pursuit is effective if there has been an immediate or continuous
pursuit of the suspect from the scene of the crime
- (2)
Eminent destruction of evidence
- The
rule is that while cops may have probable cause that drugs are located
within a premises, that alone is not enough to trigger the exigency of
imminent destruction
- There
must be more – rustling on the inside, or a toilet flushing
- (3)
The need to prevent the suspect’s escape
- (4)
The risk of danger to the police or other persons
- Exception:
Home Arrests for Minor Crimes
- When
the government’s interest is only to arrest for a minor offense
(carries no possibility of jail time), the presumption of
unreasonableness to warrantless home entries is difficult to rebut, and
the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with
a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached
magistrate
- Warrantless
Home Entry – The Murder Scene Non Exception
- When
the police come upon the scene of a homicide that may make a prompt
warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a
killer is still on the premises, and the police may seize any evidence
that is in plain view – but a warrantless search must be strictly
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation and once
the premises have been secured for injured persons and possible
searches, the purpose of such a search (care-taking function) has been
fulfilled, and further searches, without further exigencies or a
warrant, are unreasonable for the 4th
- Arrests
Made Outside the Home (With Probable Cause)
- The
police may, without a warrant, make an arrest for a felony in public places, whether the felony occurred in the
officer’s presence or not, but an arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor may be made in a
public place only if the misdemeanor was committed in the officer’s
presence
- Gerstein Hearings for Warrantless
Arrests – Probable Cause Hearing
- Requires
that in a maximum of 48 hours, an arrestee who was arrested without an
arrest warrant is entitled to a determination of probable cause by a
magistrate – can be done ex parte
- Executing
an Arrest: Use of Force
- An
arrest, even one based on probable cause, constitutes an unreasonable
seizure of the person if the method of making the arrest is unreasonable
- An
officer may not use deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeing
felon, unless she has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others
- Arrests
in a Third Persons Residence – The Steagald
Principle
- If
the police are armed with a warrant to arrest a suspect, they may enter
into a third person’s residence to arrest the suspect if they have
probable cause to believe the suspect is within – but they cannot search
the third person’s home on the basis of an arrest warrant for someone
other than the homeowner unless a warrant to search that third person’s
residence is obtained
- Search
Warrants
- Two
Approaches:
- (1)
Per Se – Insists that searches and seizures always require warrants
- (2)
Modified Per Se – A warrantless searched is per se unreasonable, but
there are defined exceptions
- Elements
of a Valid Search Warrant
- Warrants
must be based on probable cause, supported by oath of affirmation from
the officer, judged by a neutral and detached magistrate, and the
warrant must be particularized (to the person/thing to be seized and/or
the place to be searched)
- Warrant
Particularity Requirement Principles
- (1)
A relatively general description will be tolerated if the nature of the
object to be seized could not realistically be described more
specifically
- (2)
Greater generality is allowed in the case of contraband
- (3)
Greater generality is demanded if other objects of the same general
classification are likely to be found at the search site (i.e cartons
of women’s clothing will not do if the police will be searching a
warehouse containing many of such cartons)
- (4)
Scrupulous exactitude is demanded when the search encroaches on 1st
Amendment claims
- Knock
and Announce Rule
- The
4th Amendment prohibition on searches and seizures contains
an implicit knock and announce rule whereby police officers entering a
dwelling much knock on the door and announce their identity and purpose
before attempting forcible entry
- Exception:
The knock and announce rule is not required where the police have a
reasonable suspicion that knocking an announcing their presence, under
the circumstances
- (1)
Would be futile, a senseless ceremony
- (2)
Present a threat of physical violence
- (3)
That evidence most likely be destroyed if advance notice were given, or
- (4)
Where a prisoner escapes from the police and retreats to his dwelling
- Must
have Reasonable Suspicion – An officer must be able to articulate
something more than a hunch; there must be some minimal level of
justification; this is a less demanding standard than probable cause
- Policies
– A knock and announce rule serves to:
- (1)
Avoid unnecessary property damage
- (2)
Avoids injury to the police and inhabitants
- (3)
Preserves personal dignity, and
- (4)
Allows voluntary compliance with the law
- NOTE:
With knock an announce, the police already have a warrant, just must do
so as a preliminary matter, but don’t have to knock if reasonable suspicion
determines otherwise
- COMPARED:
To exigent circumstances exception, there is no need for a warrant to
enter a home because it is an exception to the warrant requirement
- In
Anticipation of a Warrant
- The
police, upon probable cause, may seize a residence, building, or car
without a warrant and refuse to allow the lawful owners of the premises
access to the premises without some police supervision to ensure any
evidence believed to be inside will be destroyed
- STANDARD:
- (1)
The police must have probable cause to believe that the residence,
building, or car contains evidence of a crime that may be seized
(remember the four categories)
- (2)
Have good reason to fear that, unless restrained, the suspect would
destroy the evidence before a warrant can be executed
- (3)
Make reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enforcement needs with
the demands of personal privacy (i.e can’t search the premises nor
arrest the suspect before obtaining a warrant)
- (4)
Impose the restraint for a limited period of time no longer than
reasonably necessary for the police, acting with due diligence, to
obtain the warrant (there is no set time limit)
- Executing
a Warrant After Entry: The Scope of the Search of the Premises
- Once
officers are lawfully on the premises to execute a warrant:
- (1)
They may search containers large enough to hold the criminal evidence
for which they are searching
- (2)
While officers execute a search warrant, they may seize an object not
defined in the warrant, if they have probable cause to believe it is an
item that may be seized
- (3)
Information that becomes available to officers immediately before or
during the execution of a warrant may require them to cease or narrow
their search, notwithstanding the dictates of the warrant
- Cops
May Make Reasonable Mistakes
- As
to the third element above, the exclusionary rule will apply to
preclude the introduction of evidence obtained a mistaken search of the
wrong premises, unless the mistake was reasonable
- If
the mistake was reasonable, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the
warrant was otherwise valid
- Searching
Persons During the Execution of a Warrant
- A
warrant may authorize the search of a person, but it should be explicit;
a warrant to search a home or other premises does not provide implicit
authority to search persons found at the scene, even if the criminal
evidence for which the police are looking might be found on them
- Exception:
The police must have independent probable cause to search the person, as
well as some justification for conducting the search without a warrant
(i.e. they must be able to point to an exception of the warrant
requirement such as a search incident to arrest or a Terry pat down if the officers
have reasonable suspicion)
- Seizure
of Persons During Warranted Searches
- Although
officers may not automatically search persons who are at the scene
during the execution of a search warrant, the court has held that a
warrant to search a place implicitly carries with it the limited
authority to detain (seize) the occupants of the premises while a proper
search is conducted
- When
are Warrants Required? - Exceptions
- (1) Exigent
Circumstances
- (2)
Searches Incident to an Arrest
- When
a custodial arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer
to search the person in order to remove any weapons that the arrestee
might seek to use in order to resist the officer or effect his escape,
and if it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and
seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction
- The
scope of this search extends to those areas that are within the
arrestee’s grab area – the area within his immediate control, for
weapons or evidentiary items whether the arrestee is cuffed or not
- The
search incident to arrest attaches automatically, and does not require a
warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion
- Time
Limitation: If the search is remote in time or place from the arrest, no
exigencies exist, thus, the search incident to arrest must be
contemporaneous to the arrest
- NOTE:
Different from Terry pat down,
in that in a Terry pat down
occurs without the suspect being arrested; it also is limited to a pat
down of the outer clothing for weapons only
- Extended:
The search incident to arrest has been extended for officer safety to
areas adjoining the room or hallway or area that could conceal another
attacker
- But
there is no justification for routinely searching every room in the
residence, or for searching through desk drawers or other closed or
concealed areas in the room itself – such searches, absent an
exception, may be made only under the authority of a search warrant
- (3)
Arrest Inventories
- After
a defendant is taken into custody, he has to be transported to the
station for booking, and typically undergoes a second search (after the
incident to arrest) – an “arrest inventory,” if she will be
incarcerated, even temporarily
- This
inventory search occurs without a warrant or probable cause
- Justifications:
- (1)
To protect the arrestee from theft of her valuables
- (2)
To reduce the risk of false claims of theft by the arrestee
- (3)
To ensure that contraband and dangerous instrumentalities that might
have been missed by the police in the initial search incident to arrest
are not smuggled into the jail
- (4)
Search of a Car Incident to an Arrest of its Occupant
- The
courts have construed the “area within the immediate control of the
arrestee” in a search incident to arrest to mean that when a cop has
made a lawful custodial arrest of a “recent occupant” of an automobile,
he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the
passenger compartment of that automobile, including an examination of
any containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the
passenger compartment is within the reach of the arrestee, so also will
be containers, and such a container may be searched whether it is open
or closed
- NOTE:
Difference from automobile exception, in that the search incident to
arrest encompasses only the passenger compartment, and not the trunk –
But if during the search of the interior of the car, the cop gains
probable cause to believe there is criminal evidence in the trunk, the
trunk may be searched under the automobile exception, and the rule is
that if drugs are found in one compartment, then there is probable cause
that there are drugs in other compartments for purposes of the
automobile exception
- No
Searches Incident to Lawful Citation
- When
you are pulled over an cited, you are seized, but not taken into
custodial arrest, thus, it is unreasonable under the 4th for
an officer to conduct a search of the interior of the car because there
is no “arrest” to justify a search incident thereto
- Policy:
A routine traffic stop is a brief encounter not triggering the
exigencies to an incident to arrest; once the defendant is pulled over
and a citation has been issued, all the evidence necessary to prosecute
that offense has been obtained
- Exception:
Officers may simply arrest traffic violators, and search them incident
to arrest, and the passenger compartment search incident to arrest also
- Texas allows
custodial arrests for seatbelt violations
- Pretextual
Stops and Arrests (Particularly in Automobiles)
- Regardless
of whether a cop subjectively believes that the occupants of an
automobile may be engaging in some other illegal behavior, a traffic
stop is permissible if based on probable cause and a reasonable officer
in the same circumstances could have stopped the car for the suspected
traffic violation
- (5)
The Automobile Exception (Not a search incident to arrest)
- Automobiles
and automobiles that are readily movable may be searched without a
warrant in circumstances that would not justify the search without a
warrant in a house or office, provided that there is probable cause to
believe that the car contains articles entitled to be seized, and the
scope of the search extends to the entire vehicle, not just the
passenger compartment
- Justification:
Mobility of a car, reduced expectation of privacy stemming from a car’s
use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of regulations
- Scope:
The probable cause must be aimed at the containers within the car, the
scope is restricted to containers that may be able to physically contain
the suspected evidence
- Exception:
In cases where the car is in a state of extreme immobility, the courts
will not allow the automobile exception because in such circumstances,
nothing impedes the police from posting an officer to the car and
excluding person from it while a warrant is obtained
- Parked
Cars: If a car is parked but the officer has probable cause to search
the car for criminal evidence, the courts have held that the car is
readily mobile by the turn of the ignition, thus may search under the
auto-exception; NOTE that the owner of the car does not necessarily have
to be near the car while search conducted
- Exception:
Where a car is parked at home in the driveway and there is no chance the
vehicle will be moved, and there is probable cause to believe the car
contains criminal evidence, the police may post an officer to watch the
car because under such circumstances, the justification for the
automobile exception is not present as the car is not going to be moved
(Coolidge was a plurality
opinion, and restricted to its specific facts)
- Automobile
Exception and Motor Homes
- When
a motor home is being used on highways, or if it is readily capable of
such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly for
residential purposes, temporary or otherwise, the two justifications for
the automobile exception come into play: (1) the vehicle is readily
movable by the turn of an ignition key, and (2) there is a reduced
expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle subject to policy regulations.
- (6)
Automobile Inventory
- When
vehicles are impounded, local police departments generally follow a
routine practice of securing and inventorying the automobile’s contents
(same policy reasons as an arrest inventory)
- The
inventory, however, must be made pursuant to, and not exceed the scope
of, department established policies and procedures for inventory
searches
- (7)
Containers in a Car
- The
automobile exception applies to justify a warrantless search of a
vehicle that is supported by probable cause that the vehicle contains
criminal evidence or that the criminal evidence is within a container
that is located in a car.
- (8)
Containers Belonging to Passengers
- Cops
with probable cause to search a car may inspect any passenger’s
belongings found in the car, not in the immediate physical possession of
the passenger, that are capable of concealing the object of the search
- Exception:
If the police have no probable cause to suspect a passenger of criminal
activity, and their containers are on their physical person, then the
automobile exception does not apply
- The
police would be required to have new and independent probable cause to
search a passenger and his belongings and must have an exception to the
warrant requirement
- (9)
Plain View Doctrine
- An
officer may lawfully seize an search an article that is in plain view
if:
- (1)
The cop viewed the article from a lawful vantage point (i.e. the
officer had a lawful right to be where he was when he viewed the
article)
- (2)
Immediately recognizable as contraband or seizable item
- (3)
A lawful right of access to the item
- (10)
Plain Touch Doctrine
- If
a cop lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object
whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has
been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy (same elements as plain view)
- (11)
Consent
- An
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements
- Prosecutor
has the burden of a preponderance of the evidence that the consent was
freely and voluntarily given, and not the product of duress or coercion,
by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force
- Whether
consent was voluntary requires an inquiry into the totality of the
circumstances, including:
- (1)
Whether the subject knew he had a right to refuse consent
- (2)
Whether the police knew of the vulnerability of a particular subject
and exploited it
- (3)
Evidence of minimal schooling and low intelligence
- The
government need not establish that the subject had knowledge of his
right to refuse consent to establish effective consent because the right
to refuse consent is not a constitutional right that must be waived
(unlike Miranda)
- Consent
cannot be given when the subject merely acquiesced to a claim of lawful
authority by the police
- Consent
may be withdrawn – the police must honor the citizen’s wishes, unless
their pre-withdrawal search gives them independent grounds to proceed
- A
person can limit the temporal nature (“you may search for two minutes”)
or the scope of the search (“you may search my kitchen, but not my
bedroom”)
- Scope
of Consent
- Scope
of the search for the item includes containers that may bear that item,
but not containers that physically could not
- Under
a general consent to search, it is unreasonable to destroy property in
a search, even if, for example, a paper bag is stapled shut (unless
granted specific consent to do so)
- (12)
Third Party Consent
- Consent
may be from third party who possessed common authority over, or other
sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be
inspected
- Third
party consent must be voluntary
- Common
authority:
- Rests
on mutual use of the property by persons having joint access or control
for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of
the co-habitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own
right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their
number might permit the common area to be searched
- Standard:
Objective standard
- Would
the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had actual
authority over the premises (i.e. apparent authority)
- The Terry Doctrine (Temporary
Investigation)
- Where
a cop observes unusual conduct, the cop may, without probable cause,
with reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot temporarily detain person
for investigation, and with reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be
armed and dangerous, make a limited search for weapons by a “pat down”
of the outer clothing
- Reasonable
Suspicion: The cop must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together, with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant the stop and frisk (it can’t be a mere “hunch”)
- Scope:
The scope is limited to a pat down of the suspect’s outer clothing for
weapons
- Policy:
Protection of the police
- If
reasonably suspect that murder or other violent crime has occurred or is
about to, that has been held as a per se reasonable suspicion to pat
down
- A Terry stop can occur after a
crime has been committed
- A
person merely talking to drug dealers is not enough for reasonable
suspicion for a pat down
- Reasonable
Suspicion – High Crime Area
- Mere
presence in an area known for high crime is not enough to support reasonable
suspicion that crime is afoot
- Unprovoked
flight in a high crime area supports a finding of reasonable suspicion
that crime is afoot and/or armed and dangerous
- Terry De Facto Arrest
- A
custodial interrogation based merely on reasonable suspicion amounts to
a de facto arrest and the scope of Terry
has been violated
- During
a traffic stop, a cop may on reasonable suspicion of crime afoot order
the driver out of the car and his passengers without additional
justification, and if reasonable suspicion to frisk the driver, than may
do so for the passenger without additional justification because of the
dangerous situation (Remember, need articulable facts for reasonable
suspicion – making an illegal turn is not enough)
- Length
of Detention
- A Terry stop is reasonable in its
scope in terms of duration if:
- (1)
The police diligently pursue a means of investigation likely to
confirm or dispel their suspicions, and
- (2)
The cop’s failure to recognize or pursue a less burdensome alternative
means of investigation was not unreasonable under the circumstances
- Exception:
If the suspect consents to the length of the duration, than the time
issue is obviated, unless she withdraws consent
- Seizure
of a Person for 4th Amendment
- A
person is seized under the 4th Amendment only when, by means
of physical force or submission to an assertion of authority, the
person’s freedom of movement is restrained, and under the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable person would not believe that he was not free
to leave
- If
defendant is seized before reasonable suspicion for Terry stop, the seizure is unreasonable under the 4th
Amendment
- Examples
of circumstances that might indicate a seizure:
- (1)
Threatening presence of several officers
- (2)
Display of a weapon by an officer
- (3)
Some physical touching of the person of the citizen
- (4)
The use of language or tone of voice indicating compliance with request
is likely compelled
- Momentary
Submission: A defendant’s momentary submission to a show of authority or
physical contact, however brief, is enough for a seizure if reasonably
would not feel free to leave
- Remain
for Independent Reasons: If the individual remains in his place for
independent reasons (i.e. bus case where defendant wanted to ride the
bus), the standard in such circumstances is whether a reasonable person
would feel free to decline the officer’s requests or otherwise terminate
the encounter
- Extending
the Terry Doctrine – Seizure of
Personalty (Luggage/containers)
- Terry allows a warrantless seizure
of personalty (luggage) on the basis of
mere reasonable suspicion for the purpose of a limited
investigation
- Effect:
When an officer’s observations lead him to reasonable believe that a
traveler is carrying luggage that contains narcotics, Terry permits the officer to
detain the luggage briefly to investigate the circumstances that aroused
his suspicion, provided the detention is properly limited in scope with
respect to time and intrusion
- Exception:
The person whose luggage is detained is technically free to continue his
travels or carry out other personal activities pending release of the
luggage
- Extending
the Terry Doctrine – Pat Down of
Interior of a Car
- If a
defendant is lawfully pulled over and the police gain reasonable
suspicion, during the temporary investigation of the defendant that crime
is afoot, and the defendant is armed and dangerous, and the car contains
weapons, the officer may frisk the defendant, and passenger compartment
of car for weapons including containers that may contain a weapon, and
any evidence seized during that frisk of the car or person is admissible
- NOTE:
If the police in their pat down of the car find drugs in a container
reasonable suspected of containing a weapon, this is probable cause for
the automobile exception to search the rest of the car for more drugs, including
the trunk.
- Extending
the Terry Doctrine – Terry Protective Sweeps Incident to
an Arrest
- If,
during a lawful arrest of a defendant within his home, or the home of
another, the cops gain a reasonable suspicion that the surrounding areas
of the home pose a danger to the police, the cops, in addition to a
search incident to an arrest of the person and the immediate areas of
control of the defendant (which includes adjoining hallways and closets),
may also conduct a “protective sweep,” a cursory visual inspection of
those places in which a person may be hiding or laying in wait, without a
warrant, but the sweep must be diligently pursued to dispel the
reasonable suspicion of danger, and in any event it should take no longer
than the time to complete the arrest and depart
- Note:
During a protective sweep, officers may encounter seizable items in plain
view
- Policy:
For protection of police
- The
“Special Needs” Doctrine (Non-Criminal Context)
- Some
searches and seizures by the government must be conducted, and if
probable cause or reasonable suspicion was required, it would frustrate
the government’s “special need” to conduct the stop and search
- Standard:
“Special needs” search or seizure is triggered if the primary purpose for
the stop or search is distinguishable from a general interest in law
enforcement, and the court will look to the express purpose and the
actual effect of the program in its determination
- Administrative
Searches
- Building
inspections
- Heavily
regulated industry searches
- School
searches
- In
school searches, there must be a reasonable suspicion that a policy or
school rule has been violated
- If
reasonable suspicion is found, then may search (i.e. lockers) without
probable cause or a warrant based on the same
- Border
searches
- Policy:
Primary purpose is not arresting and prosecution, but protecting the
sovereign
- Fixed
border searches – Does not require any particularized suspicion
- Roving
border searches – Must have reasonable suspicion to stop a car near a
border to search for illegal crossings
- Police
checkpoints (Sobriety checkpoints)
- A
sobriety checkpoint is constitutional if it passes a three-prong
balancing test of the following factors:
- (1)
The state’s interest in conducting the checkpoint
- The
primary purpose must be a non law enforcement interest of protecting
the public on the road and preventing property damage
- (2)
The effectiveness of checkpoints in achieving that goal, and
- (3)
The level of intrusion of an individual’s privacy caused by the
checkpoints
- To
curb the discretion of police, there must be a department policy in
place regarding the system of checking (i.e. every third driver
checked)
- Effect:
No need for any particularized suspicion at all if these three are
balanced in favor of the government, but to actually order a person out
of the car, there must be at least a reasonable suspicion of DWI
- Exception:
Checkpoints for drug possession in automobiles have been held to have a
primary purpose of law enforcement and require at least a reasonable
suspicion to stop a vehicle (if the roadblock’s express purpose was to
prevent drug abuse and protect the public, may have a chance, but court
will look to the effect of the program to gain the primary purpose)
- Exception
to Exception: There are circumstances that may justify a law
enforcement checkpoint where the primary purpose is related to crime
investigation, but an exigency is present (belief that an imminent
terrorist attack, or catch a dangerous criminal)
- Suspicion-less
Drug Testing
- Provided
the primary purpose is distinguishable from the government’s general
interest in law enforcement, drug testing may be conducted on a
suspicion-less basis (i.e. certain companies, customs officials, high
school athletes)
- Standing
to Assert 4th Amendment
- For
someone to have “standing” to assert his 4th Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, that person must show
that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy from the government’s
search under circumstances
- Effect:
If the search was illegal, but the defendant does not have standing, then
whether the search was lawful is no issue because defendant has no
grounds for relief under the 4th Amendment (the legality of
the search is a separate issue from standing)
- Standing
for Contesting Illegal Electronic Surveillance
- A
person has standing to contest electronic surveillance, and thus is
entitled to suppression of unlawfully heard conversations, if:
- (1)
The government agents unlawfully overheard that person’s conversations
that that person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in, regardless
of where they occurred, or
- (2)
If the conversations occurred on that person’s premises, whether or not
she was present or participated in the conversations
- Ownership:
A claim of ownership, control or dominion in the thing searched is not
controlling, but will held make out an argument that defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy
- Overnight
Guests: Overnight guests at another person’s residence with their consent
have a reasonable expectation of privacy while in that person’s residence
- Will
not apply where there for commercial purposes, for the first time, and
for a short duration
- Passenger
in Car: If merely riding as a passenger, then no expectation privacy to
contest the search of the car (maybe if passenger claimed some ownership,
control, or dominion over something in the car)
- Exception
Suppression Hearing Evidence: At a hearing on a motion to suppress, the
defendant may admit ownership of the contraband seized – the prosecution
is forbidden from using such evidence at trial if the defendant loses the
suppression hearing, but it can be used to impeach the defendant
- Note
Plain View: Remember that plain view may come in to defeat a standing
claim on the basis that a person generally has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in objects left in plain view
- Exceptions
to the Exclusionary Rule
- Civil
Trials – Exclusionary rules does not apply to preclude use of illegally
searched or seized evidence in civil trials
- Grand
Jury – Prosecutors may use evidence obtained in violation of 4th
at grant jury proceedings
- Impeachment
Exception
- Good
Faith Exception – Evidence obtained by the police pursuant to a warrant
subsequently held invalid will not be excluded if the police officer, in good faith, had grounds to
objectively reasonably rely on the magistrate’s probable cause
determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant issued
- Exceptions
to Exception: Suppression remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate
in issuing the warrant was (1) misled by information in an affidavit that
the cop knew was false or (2) would have known was false, but for his
reckless disregard for the truth, (3) the magistrate abandoned his
judicial role in being a neutral and detached judicial official, or (4)
an officer does not manifest good faith by (a) relying on a warrant based
on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause to render belief
in its existence entirely unreasonable, or (b) relying on a warrant that
is so facially deficient
- Exception
Clerk’s Mistake: An officer may rely on a clerk
- Fruit
of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
- Any
evidence gathered as a result of a search or seizure in violation of the
4th Amendment, whether direct or derivative evidence, will be
excluded
- The
“poison tree,” the illegal search must be identified and any evidence
gathered as a result of the illegal search or seizure is the “fruit”
- Applies
to tangible and intangible evidence, such as conversations
- Attenuation
Doctrine – Exception to Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
- When
the connection between the illegal government act and evidence to be
introduced has become so attenuated that the taint from the initial
illegal act has dissipated, then the exclusionary rule will not apply to
preclude the introduction of the evidence
- Factors:
- (1)
The temporal proximity between the time of the illegal search or seizure
and the time they obtain the evidence they seek to introduce
- (2)
Whether any significant events have intervened between illegality and
acquisition of the evidence (consulting with counsel, new and distinct
crime, Miranda is a factor,
but not dispositive)
- (3)
The purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct
- Quasi-
Attenuation – Warrantless Home Arrest
- Where
the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary
rule does not bar the State’s use of a statement made by the defendant
outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest
made in the home in violation of the warrantless home arrests
- Quasi-Attenuation
– Fruit is a Witness
- If
a search or seizure is conducted in violation of the 4th, and
the illegal search of seizure leads them to a witness, the exclusionary
rule will rarely be applied based on the theory that the witness may
come forward voluntarily
- Independent
Source Doctrine – Exception to Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
- Even
if the police seize evidence from an illegal search or seizure, the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine will not apply if the police can show that
an independent source of information led them to the evidence that would
otherwise be fruit from an illegal search
- Inevitable
Discovery Doctrine – Exception to Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
- Evidence
may be admitted if it would
(not could) “inevitably” have been discovered, in a short amount of time,
in substantially the same condition, by other police techniques had it
nor first been obtained as fruit of an illegal search or seizure
- Evidence
would inevitable have been discovered by lawful means
- Compare:
The distinction between independent source and inevitable discovery is
that with independent source, the government starts out with legally
obtained evidence and tries to make that showing, whereas with inevitable
discovery, the government starts with illegally obtained evidence and
must show than an exception applies
V. Confessions
- Under
the due process clause, confessions are inadmissible, unless voluntary
- And a
confession is not voluntary, but coerced where the defendant has so lost
his freedom of action that the confession made was not his but the result
of the deprivation of his free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to
answer
- Standard:
Whether the government acted so as to overbear the defendant’s freewill,
and the court will consider, under the totality of the circumstances:
- (1)
The characteristics of the suspect that bear on the suspect’s
susceptibility to coercion
- Such
as education, immigrant, illiterate, mental illness, speaks English
- Different
characteristics may have higher thresholds depending on the suspect
- Doesn’t
matter whether the police know of the mental condition or not, unless
they exploit it
- (2)
The process, procedure and nature of the interrogation
- Such
as duration of questioning, tenacity of interrogators, changing of
interrogators, whether threats are made, immediate application of force,
threats of future danger
- (3)
The morality of the officer’s conduct in the investigation
- Such
as using a childhood friend to play on the fears and weaknesses of the
suspect, intentionally exploiting a suspect’s religion (i.e. sending a
cop in as a priest)
- Whether
cops actions “shock the conscience”
- Whether
the cops acted in good faith or not is not of importance, where the
elements are met and the defendant’s will is overborne, it’s an
involuntary confession
- Inherent
Coercion: Physical coercion with beating, threats of physical coercion,
questions for days with no rest
- State
action is required for a confession to be coerced
- Necessity
Defense for Coercion: Ticking time bomb (undecided issue)
- Voluntary
versus Reliability
- If a
confession is coerced from a defendant, but there is no state action, due
process is not implicated, even if that confession is presented to the
government and the prosecutor knew it was happening; but state law on
evidence, or federal rules of evidence may prevent the confession from
carrying any reliable value, even if probative, by effective
cross-examination, and is a question of fact for the fact-finder (i.e.
vigilante group beats confession from defendant and turns it over to
prosecutor who acquiesces to the behavior)
VI. The 5th
Amendment Privilege against Self-Incrimination
- “No
person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.”
- Miranda and the 5th
Amendment
- The
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant, unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination
- Procedural
Safeguards:
- (1)The
suspect must be informed he has a right to remain silent;
- (2)
Anything he says can be used against him in a court of law;
- (3)
That he has a right to an attorney, even during questioning, and if he
cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for him
- Once
the defendant has been read his rights, the police still can not
interrogate the defendant unless they secure a waiver from the defendant,
and silence is not a per se waiver; the burden is on the state to show
that a proper waiver was secured
- Proper
Waiver: A defendant constitutionally waives his 5th Amendment
right if he does so (1) voluntarily, (2) knowingly, and (3) intelligently
- A
defendant may waive his rights and has the liberty to change his mind
and withdraw the waiver, and at that point, interrogation must cease
- Policy:
Police interrogation is inherently coercive
- Exception:
If the defendant is not in “custody,” and is not being “interrogated,”
the police do not need to secure a waiver from a suspect to talk to him
- The
officer’s state of mind is irrelevant for Miranda regarding whether he intends at a certain point that
he will or will not arrest a suspect
- Not
Crime Specific: Miranda is not
crime specific; that is, once a suspect is in custody and is
interrogated, Miranda must be
complied with regardless if the defendant is interrogated per the crime
he was arrested or, or for another crime he is suspected to have
committed
- “Custody”
under Miranda
- A
person is in custody if he is deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way; if a reasonable person from the perception of the
individual, would under the circumstances, not feel free to leave, that
person is in custody
- Roadside
Custody: A defendant detained per a traffic study is in “custody” for Miranda if the defendant’s freedom
of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest (i.e. de
facto arrest, infra)
- Station
Exception: Interrogation at police station, without more is not
“custody;” fact intensive inequity
- It
doesn’t matter if the officers believe the defendant is free to leave, it
is the defendant’s perception which is key
- Miranda Interrogation
- Miranda safeguards come into play
when a person in custody is subjected to either express interrogation, or
its functionally equivalent, which are, respectively, express questions
or words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating testimonial response
- Testimonial
Limitation: A response is “testimonial,” whether in verbal or conduct
form, if it is to be admitted to show a communication of thoughts
- If
the response is not “testimonial,” the 5th is not implicated,
and Miranda warnings are not
required
- Real
and physical evidence (i.e. results of a compelled blood test, DNA) is
not testimonial
- The
results of a lie detector test are testimonial because they communicate
thoughts
- Exception
– Witness Type Questions: A question of “what happened” or “did you see
anything,” is more of a witness type question not designed to elicit an
incriminating response
- Exception
– Booking Questions: Routing booking questions are not interrogative
- Undercover/Jail
Plant Exception: Even though a defendant is in custody when in jail, and
even though a jail plant is questioning the defendant, by asking
questions designed to elicit an incriminating response, Miranda is not triggered because
the inherent coercive environment of a police interrogation in custody is
not present
- But
if the defendant’s response is not “voluntary,” because the jail plant
overbore the freewill of the defendant, then while the 5th
Amendment is not triggered, due process is, and any inculpatory
statements will be inadmissible
- Waiver
and Invocation of the Miranda
Rights
- A
waiver of 5th Amendment rights under Miranda are effective if the defendant voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently waived his rights; and waiver can be express or implied
by conduct, but silence alone is not waiver, and the prosecution has the
burden to show waiver by a preponderance of the evidence
- Standard
for Voluntary: Determined from the totality of the circumstances,
including (1) characteristics of the defendant, (2) the process or
procedure used, and (3) the morality of the police conduct (infra)
- Standard
for Knowing and Intelligent: Whether defendant exhibits an understanding
of the effect of his waiver (i.e. that his statements will be used
against him)
- Right
to Remain Silent: If the accused invokes his right to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease, and police must scrupulously honor the
defendant’s right to remain silent
- But
the police may, after a reasonable time, initiate waiver with the
defendant (Note: When a defendant invokes his right to counsel under Miranda, the police cannot speak
with the defendant without his lawyer present)
- Right
to Counsel: If the accused invokes his right to counsel, the
interrogation must cease and police cannot initiate waiver to further
interrogate without counsel present; but defendant may initiate
- Initiation
of Waiver: Occurs when the cops or the defendant initiates
communications relating, directly or indirectly, to the investigation
(Cops can initiate waiver by reading defendant his rights again)
- Invocation:
The invocation of the right to counsel must be clear and unequivocal
(but lower courts have construed “I think I want a lawyer” to be clear
by striking the “I think.”)
- The
5th Amendment privilege belongs to the defendant, not his
attorney or another – Only the defendant may invoke the privilege
- An
express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent
or counsel of usually strong proof of the validity of a waiver, but is
not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver
- Imputed:
Once a defendant invokes his right to counsel, then, under Edwards, that invocation is
imputed to all officers, everywhere, with a duty to inquire whether
counsel has been invoked before initiating waiver
- Even
if there has been a break in custody after defendant invokes his right to
counsel, Edwards forbids cop
initiated waiver, but there is no set limit of time that may pass for Edwards not to apply to allow
police initiated waiver
- The
standard is whether the police used the break in custody as a ploy only
to arrest or otherwise put the defendant in custody for another crime,
and read him his rights, which is in initiation of a waiver, to get
around Edwards
- Exceptions
to Miranda
- Impeachment:
While statements made in violation of Miranda
are inadmissible, they may be used to impeach a defendant if defendant
takes the stand and begins to testify untruthfully
- Witnesses:
Statements taken in violation of Miranda
that lead to a witness are inadmissible, but the witness may testify
because witnesses are never suppressible fruits of a Miranda violation (infra)
- No
Fruit: Miranda does not have
any fruit; therefore, evidence (usually confession statements) obtained
directly from a breach of Miranda
are not admissible, but if Miranda
is subsequently properly given, and defendant waives, the statements then
taken are not, as a matter of law, tainted by the earlier violation of Miranda (Note: Although Miranda warnings are not given, a
confession may nonetheless be inadmissible if it violates Due Process)
- Public
Safety Exception
- The
need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the
public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting
the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and
because Miranda has no fruit,
any subsequent inculpatory responses or evidence found on that response
are not suppressible, but once the exigency has dissipated, and
defendant is in custody, interrogation cannot continue without Miranda
- Exception:
The cop’s motivation does not matter (as long as there is an exigency)
- Miranda, Dickerson, and 18 U.S.C. §3501
- Miranda is a safeguard for 5th
Amendment, and states are constitutionally bound to afford the
protections enumerated in Miranda
- States
are allowed to provide “something more” in a form other than Miranda, but that is so unlikely
given how engrained Miranda
has become in our society
VI. Police
Interrogation - 6th Amendment Right to Counsel (Massiah)
- The 6th
Amendment right to counsel attaches upon formal charges brought against
the defendant
- Formal
Charges: Grand jury indictment, preliminary hearing, information,
arraignment
- Therefore,
a defendant has a right to counsel at every “critical stage” of the
proceedings
- Critical
Stage: Anytime government and defendant meet about charges
- Whether
the stage is critical requiring the provision of counsel depends, upon an
analysis whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights
inheres in the confrontation and the ability of counsel to mitigate that
prejudice
- The
defendant’s 6th Amendment right to counsel is violated if cops deliberately
elicit incriminating information, regardless if defendant is in custody,
from both direct and indirect surreptitious questions from the defendant
without counsel present, if the defendant has invoked his rights and not
waived
- Once
invoked, the police communicate to defendant through counsel
- If
defendant appears with counsel, the court automatically treats the
defendant as invoking his rights (Note: Under the 5th, the
right to counsel must be clearly and unequivocally invoked; thus, showing
up with counsel may invoke the 6th, but not the 5th
right to counsel)
- Jail
Plants/Undercover: Unlike Miranda,
anytime the government, through whatever means, including jail plants and
undercover officers, attempts to deliberately elicit incriminating
information, unless counsel is present, 6th right to counsel is
violated because it’s a critical stage (But if the cop merely overhears
the defendant talking to a jail mate, not planted by the government, that
is merely being a listening post, but not a deliberate solicitation)
- The 6th
Amendment Right to Counsel Has Fruit
- If
defendant’s 6th Amendment rights have attached, and defendant
invokes his right to counsel, than all evidence discovered by reason of
the cop’s deliberate elicitation of incriminating evidence without
counsel present is tainted from the violation
- Exceptions:
Because Massiah has fruit of
the poison tree doctrine, all of its exceptions apply – (a) attenuation,
(b) independent source doctrine, and (c) inevitable discovery doctrine
(Although statement is suppressed because Massiah violated, may be used to impeach)
- Waiver
of the 6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Jackson Rule
- Once
the 6th right to counsel is invoked, police cannot initiate
waiver from the defendant without counsel present, but defendant may
initiate a waiver (must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent), and a
waiver for the 6th is effectuated after the defendant waives
his rights after Miranda
- Effect:
Once right to 6th counsel has been attached and invoked, any
subsequent waiver during a police-initiated custodial interview without
counsel is ineffective
- The 6th
Amendment is Crime Specific
- Once
the 6th has attached and invoked, only the defendant may
initiate waiver, and the police cannot initiate waiver without counsel
present as to the crime the
defendant is formally charged with, and crimes that are the “same
offense”
- “Same
Offense” – Determined by looking to the elements of the crime actually
charged with; if the offense charged proves the elements of a lesser
included offense, than that lesser included offense is the “same
offense”
VII. Entrapment
- If
defendant proves entrapment, he is entitled to be acquitted of an offense
or have the charge against her dismissed; a finding of entrapment does not
than result in exclusion of evidence at trial – it necessarily bars the
successful prosecution of defendant
- Entrapment
is not a constitutional doctrine
- There
is an objective and subjective test for entrapment – as to state law,
there is a split on which one applies – but the US Supreme Court has
adopted the subjective test
- NOTE:
Whether case is being brought in federal or state court to see which test
applied
- Subjective
Test of Entrapment
- Where
government has induced an individual to break the law and the defense of
entrapment is at issue - the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
disposed to commit the criminal act prior
to first being approached by the government agents
- Proof
of pre-disposition must be independent of government acts
- Policy:
The government may not originate a criminal design, implant in an
innocent person’s mind the disposition to commit a criminal act, and then
induce the commission of the crime so that the government may prosecute
- Danger:
If the defendant raises entrapment in federal court, to prove the
subjective test, the defendant must admit he committed the crime and his
entire history of bad acts and character evidence comes into evidence
- The
subjective test is a question of fact for the fact-finder
- A
disposition to do something legal that is now illegal is not enough –
must show a predisposition to commit an act that is illegal now
- A
defendant’s readily behavior to commit the crime is strong proof for
predisposition
- Some
persons are so situated by prior occupation, or training that their
predisposition is not hard to prove (i.e. public official in position to
take bribes, a gun dealer will engage in illegal gun sales)
- Objective
Test for Entrapment
- Focuses
solely upon the nature of the police activity
- Under
this test, the defendant proves entrapment if the police activity was
reasonably likely to cause an innocent (un-predisposed) person to commit
the crime; the defendant’s own innocence or predisposition is irrelevant
- Objective
test is a question of law for the judge to decide
- Due
Process Entrapment: Even if defendant cannot show entrapment under
objective or subjective test, may still be able to show due process
violated if the government’s conduct “shocked the conscience”
VIII. Eyewitness Identification
Procedures
- An
in-court identification is admissible into evidence, even though an
out-of-court identification took place in violation of the defendant’s 6th
right to counsel, if the prosecution, pursuant to a hearing, can rebut the
presumption of tainted fruit, by clear and convincing evidence that the
witness has a recollection independent of the out-of-court identification
to make the in-court identification, and the court will consider the
following factors for an independent source:
- (1)
The prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act
- (2)
The existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and
the defendant’s actual description
- (3)
Any identification prior to lineup of another person
- (4)
Identification by picture of the defendant on a prior occasion
- (5)
Failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion
- (6)
Lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification
- Where
the defendant, post-indictment, is put in a lineup, without counsel
present – This is a critical stage of the proceedings because substantial
prejudice can visit the defendant without his counsel there to prepare a
cross-examination based on the conduct of the identification procedure
- The 6th
Amendment argument is that the identification proceeding was in violation
of the defendant’s right to counsel because it is an effort to
deliberately elicit incriminating evidence regarding the defendant,
without counsel present – And because there is fruit to Messiah, the in-court
identification is tainted fruit
- Exception:
If the out-of-court identification is in violation of Messiah it is suppressed and there is no opportunity to show
an independent recollection by clear and convincing evidence
- Exception:
If the witness/victim knows the victim, not matter how prejudicial the
out-of-court identification is, then very likely to show an independent
origin for in-court, but out-of-court still suppressed if in violation of
6th right to counsel
- Exception:
This rule does not apply to non-corporeal identifications (i.e. after
formal charge if merely shown a picture, that is prejudicial, but the
argument that counsel cannot prepare a cross-examination is not present,
and thus not a critical stage for the need of counsel)
- Exception:
There is no 5th Amendment privilege to being in a lineup
because it is not testimonial
- Due
Process Violations in Identification Procedures
- If
an identification takes place that would otherwise be unconstitutional
under the 6th Amendment, but it is not, because there is no
formal charges yet filed, the defendant may exclude an out-of-court
identification if, from the totality of the circumstance, the
identification procedure was so
unnecessarily suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification, but if the identification is
reliable, the identification is
not in violation of due process
- Biggers Factors for Reliability
- (1)
The opportunity of the witness to view the criminal act at the time of
the crime
- (2)
The witness’ degree of attention
- (3)
The accuracy of a prior description of the criminal
- (4)
The level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation
- (5)
The time between the crime and the confrontation
- Against
these factors is to be weighted the corrupting effect of the suggestive
identification itself
- Exigencies
should be considered to balance against the suggestive nature of the
procedure (i.e. if victim was near death and the only witness to the act)
IX. Pre-Trial Release
– 8th Amendment Bail Clause
- Federal
law unequivocally provides that a person arrested for a non-capital
offense shall be admitted to bail, and the fixing of bail for any
individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to reasonably
assure the presence of that specific defendant’s presence at trial
- If
an individual is not given this individualized consideration, and bail is
set arbitrarily, or otherwise, the bail is excessive under the 8th
Amendment
- The 8th
Amendment excessive bail clause has NOT been incorporated through the 14th
Amendment to be a fundamental right and the reason is that all states have
bail hearing statutes
- Bail
Reform Act
- Presumption
to Release on Recognizance or Unsecured Bond
- There
is a statutory presumption, that a defendant shall be released on his
own recognizance or unsecured bond subject to the condition that the
defendant not commit a crime, unless the judge determines that such
release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person or will
endanger the safety of any other person of the community
- Preventive
Detention (Holding over until trial)
- Pretrial
detention must be predicated on the government’s proving, by a
preponderance, the satisfaction of at least one of the six categories
enumerated
- The
first three categories are based on the nature of the charge (including
violence)
- The
fourth on the nature of the offense and defendant’s prior record
- Final
two are based on whether there is a (a) serious risk that the defendant
will either flee or (b) obstruct justice or threaten a prospective
witness or juror
- If
the government proves one of
the six categories by a preponderance, than pretrial detention is
available upon a judicial finding of clear and convincing evidence that
no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the
appearance of the person and the safety of the community
- Government
presents evidence at the detention hearing by proffer, which allows evidence in form of affidavits, live
witnesses, and FRE don’t apply
- Exception
Capital Cases: Most jurisdictions provide no bail for capital cases
because of the natural tendency to not be put to death or jail forever
- Bail
for Indigents: If truly indigent and cannot afford bail, there is a
scant argument to be made under equal protection; the counter-argument
is must a judge then provide non-monetary conditions to release with no
bail for indigents but not for others
- Due
Process Argument Against Laws Providing for Preventive Detention
- For
the Bail Reform Act, or any other law that provides for preventive
detention, to withstand a substantive due process attack, the government
had to show that the statute is not
punitive, but regulatory,
and the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to
the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment; unless
Congress expressly intended to impose punitive restrictions, the
punitive/regulatory distinction turn on whether the mechanics of the
statute are:
- (1)
Rationally connected to an alternate purpose, other than punishment
(such as protecting persons and the community), and
- (2)
Whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned to is (whether there are procedural protections in place for
the defendant, and the safety of defendant while held over)
X. Case Screening
- Constitutional
Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Charging
- Prosecutors
are given wide discretion in charging offense, but a prosecutor is not
obliged to charge for every offense the evidence supports, and must never prosecute if they themselves
have a reasonable doubt regarding the crime, even if the evidence
objectively may prove beyond a reasonable doubt
- Selective
Prosecution
- Must
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the prosecutorial policy
at issue had a discriminatory
effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose
- To
show a discriminatory effect, the defendant must show that similarly situated
individuals of a different race were not prosecuted
- This
is to get discovery
- Presumption
that DA did not engage in selective prosecution
- Prosecutorial
Vindictiveness (Due Process Issue – Penalizing Defendant Exercising Right
to Appeal)
- When
a criminal defendant is subjected to a greater punishment by the
prosecutor’s filing of greater charges or harsher sentencing on the same
conduct for the original charge, such a penalty for pursuing the
defendant’s right to appeal or collateral attack of his conviction
violates due process
- Exception:
The prosecutor may up the charge post-conviction and post defendant’s
appeal if the state can show that it was impossible to proceed on the
more serious charge at the outset
- Judicial
Screening of Cases: The Preliminary Hearing (Fed R. Crim. P. 5.1)
- The
preliminary hearing is not required because the prosecutor may seek an
indictment directly from a grand jury, but the purpose of a preliminary
hearing is to determine whether an offense has been committed and, if so,
whether there is probable cause for charging with the offense
- If
the magistrate finds there is probable cause for charging, the defendant
must either be incarcerated or admitted to bail, and if probable cause
not found, the defendant is released
- The
preliminary hearing is a “critical stage” for 6th Amendment
right of counsel to attach (Messiah)
- If
the prosecution gets an indictment from the grand jury before the
preliminary hearing is set, it eviscerates the preliminary hearing
- Exception:
States are not constitutionally required to provide either a preliminary
hearing or grand jury indictment; thus states may bring defendant to
trial on official oath that probable cause exists
- Preliminary
hearing evidence may not be used at trial, except to impeach
- Grand
Jury Screening of Cases
- Operates
in secrecy
- Prosecutor
does not need leave of court to seek a grand jury indictment
- Swears
in its own witnesses
- Grand
jury does not have the
following rights:
- Double
jeopardy clause does not bar a GJ from returning an indictment when a
prior GJ has refused to do so
- 6th
Amendment right to counsel does not attach when an individual is
summoned to appear before a GJ
- 4th
Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply in GJ proceedings
- Hearsay
rule is not enforced in GJ proceedings
- The
prosecutor is not required to present exculpatory as well as inculpatory
evidence because even if presented, the GJ is not required to consider
exculpatory evidence
- GJ
cannot compel the appearance of a witness and the production of evidence,
and must appeal to the court when such compulsion is required
- GJ
is not allowed to override constitutional protections or testimonial
privileges, such as the privilege against self-incrimination
- GJ
right is NOT incorporated to the states, but most states have GJ system
set up; the GJ is seen as an arm of the prosecution
- Two
Roles:
- (1)
As a sword – The GJ is an investigative body on whether there is
probable cause that a crime has been committed
- (2)
As a shield – Can be used to keep executive from harassing citizens on
less than probable cause
- For
federal government, if there is direct evidence that completely negates
the offense, the prosecutor must withdraw the charges
- Usually
23 members, but may indict if 12 concur, even if 23 there
- May
serve for 18 months, and can get an extension of up to 6 months after
that to be 24 months on a serving
- Harmless
error standard applied on appeal on GJ error
- The 5th
Amendment Privilege
- Provides
that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself
- It
need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the
setting in which it is asked, that to a witness there is reasonable cause
to apprehend danger from a direct answer to claim 5th
amendment, and while the danger of imaginary and unsubstantial character
will not suffice, the court has never held that the privilege is
unavailable to those who claim innocence, because one of the 5th
Amendment’s basic functions is to protect innocent men
- If
granted immunity to testify, the witness on direct should be asked
whether she was so granted because otherwise the defendant may impeach on
the grounds that she was so given in return for testimony
- But
while defendant may cross a witness to so impeach the witness, it is not
prejudice to the defendant that she is given immunity because she may in
fact cross to impeach for bias
- The
effect of the GJ Investigative Function, the 4th Amendment, and
the 5th Privilege
- Transactional
Immunity – A total blanket from prosecution for all offenses relating to
the testimony, directly or indirectly
- Use
(and derivative use) immunity – Bars the use of the testimony directly or
indirectly (i.e. if testimony leads to other evidence of other crimes) to
prosecute the witness; but with use immunity the witness can still be
prosecuted with independently obtained evidence gathered from a source
other than the testimony and the derivatives of that testimony
- Production
of Documents as Testimonial
- If a
witness is compelled to produce documents or tangible things in a trial
or to the GJ, that act of producing is testimonial in the sense that it
is an implicit testimonial opinion that the thing or documents exist,
that the witness knew of their location, and that government description
is true, and the defendant may invoke the 5th not to produce,
unless the prosecution grants her immunity, or shows that it can confirm
the location, existence, and description of the documents or things
produced through sources independent of the witness
- While
the GJ may compel production without individualized suspicion, the
request must be reasonable in scope (i.e. the production cannot be too
sweeping, otherwise it’s a violation of the 4th Amendment)
- Pretrial
Motion Practice (Fed. R Crim. P. 12)
- There
are permissive and mandatory pretrial motions (must bring both before
trial)
- The
motion to suppress is the most common
- Use
of Pretrial Testimony
- Nothing
in the pretrial hearing can be used against the defendant at trial on
the merits, but can be used to impeach
- Motion
to Change Venue
- 6th
Amendment claim to right to impartial jury
- The
right to an impartial jury under the 6th Amendment has been
interpreted to mean a right to impartial trial in the judicial district
where the crime occurred, and under Rule 21, there are two grounds to
satisfy to transfer venue:
- (1)
That there is so great a prejudice in the district of suit
- (2)
That the defendant is unable to obtain an impartial trial
- Discovery
Rules (Fed. R. Crim. P. 16)
- The
government must produce (as to defendant’s own statements) on request
from the defendant
- (1)
Defendant’s own written or recorded oral statement made to anybody (but
not persons other than the defendant)
- (2)
Any written or recording containing an oral statement of defendant that
was made to a government agent in response to interrogation reduced to
writing (must know it’s a government agent)
- (3)
Substance of any oral statement made by defendant to a government agent
in response to interrogation if government intends to use at trial not
reduced to writing yet (know it’s an agent)
- (4)
Defendant’s own GJ testimony
- A
defendant may discover the results of a physical or mental examination,
and if material the government must disclose
- The
government will not produce witness lists because of the fear of witness
tampering
- Under
the Janks Act, after the government has held a direct examination of the
of the witness, because defendant must be able to confront witnesses
against him, defendant may request a recess and be given time to
construct a cross-examination with all documents and statements that
witness has made
- Constitutional
Discovery – Prosecutor’s Duty on Exculpatory Evidence
- Exculpatory
evidence material to guilt or sentencing must be disclosed and the
prosecutor has an independent duty to disclose such evidence in the
absence of a request, and if the prosecutor does not so disclose, the
defendant’s due process rights have been violated for a fair trial, and
is entitled to a new trial
- Standard
for Material (Brady Material):
- Exculpatory
evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that had the
evidence been disclosed, it would have changed the outcome of the case
- It
doesn’t matter that it’s a specific or a general request for all
exculpatory evidence, the prosecution must disclose, even if it’s a
vague request
- The
duty to disclose by the prosecutor is a continuing duty to disclose for
evidence that they come about that is exculpatory
- Bad
Faith Destruction or Non-Preservation of Evidence by Police
- Unless
a defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to
preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due
process, for a fair trial
- Effect:
If bad faith, and intentionally destroy evidence, denial of due process
and new trial
- Exception:
Absent bad faith, the cops do not have an affirmative duty to preserve
evidence; therefore, negligence on the part of cops in preservation and
collection of evidence not violation
- Duty
of Counsel to Disclose Alibi Witnesses – 5th Amendment
Privilege
- In
many jurisdictions, for defendant to utilize an alibi defense, the
defendant must notify the prosecution and disclose the witnesses the
defendant plans to use to prove up an alibi, in order to give the
prosecution an opportunity to prepare a rebuttal with its own witnesses –
this requirement does not violate the 5th Amendment privilege
because defendant is not required to use an alibi defense
- Joinder
and Severance (Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a), 8(b))
- Joinder
of Claims
- The
indictment or information may charge a defendant in separate counts with
two or more offenses if the offenses charged – whether felony or
misdemeanor – are of the:
- (1)
Same or similar character, or
- (2)
Are based on the same act or transaction, or
- (3)
Are connected with or constitute part of a common plan or scheme
- Joinder
of Defendants in the Same Indictment
- The
indictment may charge two or more defendants if they are alleged to
have:
- (1)
Participated in the same act or transaction, or
- (2)
In the same series of acts or transactions
- Exception:
If the defendant can show prejudice of joinder of claims or defendants,
the court may order a severance because the prosecutor is not mandated
to join all defendants in one count, it is permissive
- Speedy
Trial (6th, Due Process, Federal Statute)
- In
order for a defendant to prove a violation of his right to a speedy trial
under the 6th, the court will consider the following factors:
- (1)
The length of the delay
- (2)
The reason for the delay
- (3)
The defendant’s assertion of his right (did he object), and
- (4)
Prejudice to the defendant (spend much time in jail?)
- The
right to speedy trial attaches on formal charges being brought, and if
this right is violated, the defendant’s remedy is a dismissal with prejudice
- The
Due Process guarantee of a fair trial prevents prosecutors from delaying
formal charges in bad faith to secure a tactical advantage that prejudices
the defendant – The remedy is dismissal
with prejudice
- Federal
Speedy Trial (cannot be waived) – In general, trial must begin within
30-70 days after indictment, subject to exceptions
- The
remedy is in the discretion of the court to dismiss with or without
prejudice
- The
Fundamental Right to Counsel – Capital Cases Under Due Process
- In a
capital case, where the defendant is indigent and is incapable of making
his own defense, the due process clause imposes a duty upon trial courts
to appoint counsel whether requested or not, and that duty is not
discharged unless enough time is given for the defendant and counsel to
prepare a meaningful defense
- The
Fundamental Right to Counsel – Non-Capital Cases
- The
6th Amendment right to counsel is a fundamental right for due
process incorporation to the states for both capital and non-capital
felony cases, and the state has the burden to provide such counsel
- Right
to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases
- A
criminal has a 6th Amendment right to counsel in misdemeanor
cases if the defendant will actually
be imprisoned, not whether imprisonment is authorized; therefore, the
court must project whether imprisonment is an option, and if so, counsel
must be appointed
- Counsel
must be appointed if defendant is to receive a suspended sentence, and
serve probation and restitution, because if a condition is not met,
defendant goes to jail (same for deferred adjudication)
- Right
to Counsel on First Appeal
- An
indigent defendant is entitled to counsel for his first appeal regardless
of whether an attorney would be of much benefit in the eyes of the
appellate court
- This
is not a 6th Amendment right, but a Due Process right
- Exception
Discretionary Appeals: An indigent defendant has no due process or 6th
Amendment right to counsel for discretionary appeals (In Texas, this
would be to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, except in death penalty
cases; US Supreme Court is discretionary)
- The
Right to Waive Counsel – Right to Self-Representation
- A
defendant may waive his right to counsel if he does so voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently, and a defendant knowingly and intelligently
waives his right to counsel if the defendant is properly made aware in a Faretta hearing the right to
counsel and the dangers of self-representation
- The
right to self-representation is implied from the 6th
Amendment’s right to assistance of counsel
- Technical
knowledge of the rules or law and procedure are not required for a
knowing and intelligent waiver, but a defendant must abide by the rules
- Reserved
Right to Stop Pro Se and Appoint Stand By Counsel
- The
judge may terminate self-representation for misconduct, and if need to
may appoint stand-by counsel over objection of defendant
- But
defendant is entitled to control over his case, and standby counsel
cannot destroy the jury’s perception that defendant is representing
himself (i.e. standby counsel giving opening or closing or objecting)
- Remedy
for violation of self-representation is reversal and new trial
- No
right to claim ineffective assistance of counsel if self-represent
- Grounds
for appeal are whether the judge properly advised the defendant of
dangers of self-representation (i.e. that his waiver was not voluntary
and knowing)
- Exception
Appeal: Defendant has no right to self-representation on appeal
- Competency
to Decide Whether to Waive Counsel and Plead Guilty
- Whether
the defendant has a rational understanding of the proceedings against him
and is able to assist counsel in his representation (same for pleading
guilty, representing himself, stand trial)
- The 6th
Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel – Strickland
- A
criminal defendant is entitled to reasonable effective assistance of
counsel, and for a convicted defendant to make out an ineffective
assistance claim against counsel to require reversal of a conviction or
death sentence, defendant must prove two elements:
- (1)
Counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
- (2)
Defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, and but for
counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability, from
the totality of the evidence (including what came in and what didn’t)
that the defendant would not have been convicted, or with regard to
sentencing that the defendant would have received a lighter sentence
- Exception:
Courts will not presume a strategy when counsel limits his investigation
- Actual
and Constructive Denial of Counsel as Ineffective Assistance – Presumed
Prejudice
- If
defendant can show that he was actually or constructively denied counsel,
prejudice is presumed triggering automatic reversal and new trial
- Actual:
Where defendant is literally kept from being appointed counsel
- Constructive:
Where counsel is appointed, but denied access to help prepare his
defense, or lawyer was sleeping
- Actual
Conflict of Interest as Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
- If
there is a possible conflict of interest hindering the performance of
counsel,
- (1)
And there is objection made about the counsel,
- The
court must hold a hearing and if the court finds that there is no
conflict of interest, than on appeal the trial court’s findings are
given deference – if the court finds a conflict, counsel must withdraw
and new counsel must be appointed
- If
the court does not hold a hearing on the conflict, prejudice is presumed and automatic reversal and new trial
- (2)
And there is no objection made about the conflict, prejudice is presumed
and defendant is entitled to reversal and a new trial if defendant can
show:
- There
was an actual conflict of interest, and that conflict adversely
affected counsel’s performance as to that defendant’s defense
- Plea
Bargaining (Fed. R. Crim. P. 11)
- A
plea is valid if defendant is competent to plead guilty and the plea is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
- There
must be a factual basis for the plea if the defendant insists he is
innocent but pleads guilty anyways
- A
plea is not involuntary if inducement is avoiding the death penalty
- Defendant
may enter a conditional plea of guilty, reserving in writing the right to
have an appellate court review an adverse determination on a specified
pre-trial motion. A defendant who
prevails on appeal may then withdraw the plea.
- The
court shall have no hand in structuring the plea bargain
- Once
plea bargain is reached, the defendant cannot withdraw from the plea
merely because the court does not take the recommendation of the
prosecution
- Defendant
may withdraw from a plea before the court accepts the plea, for any
reason; but once the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes
sentence, the defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty if the court
refuses the plea bargain, or can show a fair and just reason to withdraw
the plea
- Once
plea is accepted and the court imposes sentence, the defendant may not
withdraw a plea of guilty, and the plea may be set aside only on direct
appeal or collateral attack
- Fast
track pleas are constitutional
- Factual
Basis for the Plea
- The
court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea, but
there is no constitutional requirement that the court or the record,
reflect a factual basis of defendant’s guilt
- If
the defendant maintains innocence, the court, in its inquiry of whether
the plea is voluntary, knowing and intelligent must subjectively
determine a factual basis to accept the plea, but a hearing is not
required
- A
judge need not believe the defendant’s guilt to accept a plea
- Making
and Breaking Deals
- A
defendant is denied due process if a prosecutor does not honor his plea
agreement
- The
due process clause is not a code of ethics for the prosecutor
- Proof
of actual vindictive prosecutorial plea bargaining is a violation of due
process
- If
a prosecutor threatens to bring a charge that is legally permitted to
bring, this is not vindictive prosecutorial behavior
- Right
to Jury Trial – 6th Amendment
- A
defendant is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial if the crime
charged is serious, but not if the crime is petty
- Serious
crime provides for incarceration for more than 6 months, or if the fines
are so severe that reflect a legislative determination that the offense
in question is serious
- Petty
crime is one with incarceration up to and including 6 months (you cannot
aggregate time amongst petty crimes, even if they exceed six months
collectively)
- We
look to the time authorized, not what the defendant actually received
- A
defendant may waive his right to a jury trial with approval of court and
the consent of the government
- Defendant
has a right to a public trial, but not a private trial
- Federal
system requires a 12 man jury; state criminal defendants do not have a
constitutional requirement to a 12 man jury; in fact, a 6 man jury is
constitutionally allowed in non capital cases, but 5 is too small
- Federal
system requires unanimous verdicts; states are not constitutionally bound
to do the same; the Supreme Court has indicated that a positive vote of 9
is as low as they will go – with 6 person juries, they must be unanimous
- States
do not have to give a jury trial in every single criminal prosecution
- Jury
Selection & 6th Amendment Right to Impartial Jury
- A
defendant is entitled to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross
section of the community
- Defendant
does not have a right to a fair cross section within the final panel
that actually adjudicates his case, but is entitled to a fair cross
section of the community that makes up the jury pool
- Standard
for a Cross Section Violation:
- A
distinctive group in the community was excluded resulting in
disproportionate representation in the venire by a systematic exclusion
- A
distinctive group is defined and limited by some factor that a common
thread or basic similarity in attitude, ideas, or experience runs
through the group, and there is a community of interests among the
members of the group such that the group’s interest cannot be
adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection
process
- Voir
Dire
- A
defendant may inquire into racial bias in jury selection if:
- Ham Standard: The defendant has
a due process right that binds the states to allow a defendant to
inquire into racial bias in jury selection if racial issues are
inextricably bound up in the case, or
- Federal
Supervisory Prong (applies only to federal system) – The defendant may
inquire into racial bias in jury selection if there is a reasonable
possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice might influence the jury
(i.e. typical case is an interracial crime of violence)
- Capital
Cases (Constitutional/binds states) – There is a right for the
defendant to inform the jury pool of the race of the victim and inquire
into racial bias
- Strikes
for Cause
- There
is no limit on how many jurors can be struck for cause
- Two
Types:
- (1)
The juror is not qualified (can’t speak English, not citizens, felon)
- (2)
The juror is biased
- The
court must make an inquiry whether the individual juror,
notwithstanding their bias, can still do their job
- Per
se bias cannot be implied by membership in an organization
- Even
if a juror is morally opposed to the death penalty, that is not per se
bias if they can still do their job
- Peremptory
Strikes
- Each
side is allotted a limited number of peremptory strikes to exclude a
juror for whatever reason other than race or gender
- If
a juror is excluded for race or gender, the defendant will most likely
bring an equal protection claim
- Equal
Protection Claims in Jury Selection Strikes
- Defendant
must:
- Raise
an inference of discrimination (show facts and circumstances, i.e.
prosecutor struck all blacks) upon which
- The
prosecutor will come forward with a race neutral explanation (i.e. bad
feeling, looked at me wrong), and upon that, the
- Judge
must decide whether prosecutor’s explanation is legitimate or merely a
pretext for discrimination