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Rule 66. Trial Amendment
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleading, or if during the trial any defect, fault or omission in a pleading, either of form or substance, is called to the attention of the court, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the allowance of such amendment would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits, the court may grant a postponement to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
Source: Federal Rule 15(b) (last two sentences) with minor textual change.
Oct. 29, 1940, eff. Sept. 1, 1941.
March 31, 1941, eff. Sept. 1, 1941
(No. 27-a) Question: When a justice court case is appealed to the county court and the pleadings are reduced to writing under Rule 525, do the oral pleadings in the justice court go out of the case to the extent that they cannot be shown?
Answer: In the sense that the oral pleadings go out of the case for the purpose of trial and relief in the county court, we consider that the situation is one like that of amendment: The new pleading takes the place of the old and the old is no longer a part of the case. However, it may become important to show what the old pleadings were in connection with contentions under the statutes of limitation and with contentions that a new cause of action has been set up for the first time in the county court.
It should be added that while, therefore, the written pleadings in the county court are the pleadings upon which the case is tried, if the trial is upon certain proof that is variant from or has no support in the written pleadings, but no objection or the like is made to the variance or departure, Rule 67 applies and it will be as though there had been sufficient pleading. In this connection see also Rule 66 as to ready amendment if objection is made. Doubtless in a case of appeal from justice to county court the rules above cited would not go to the extent of allowing a new cause of action to be set up in the county court or recovered on in the county court; but with this qualification there should be little difficulty about variance or departure. And, of course, by the time of a special issue submission all pleadings relied upon in the submission would have to be in writing, under Rules 67, 277, and 279, unless the defect should be waived under Rule 274.
5 Tex. B.J. 287 (1942) reprinted in 8 Tex. B.J. 19 (1945).
(No. 114) Question: Does the opinion of the Supreme Court in Jones v. Ross, 141 Tex. 415, 173 S.W.2d 1022 (1943), adversely affect the abolition of the general demurrer and the provisions for ready amendment of defects of appellate procedure under the Rules of Civil Procedure?
Answer: We think that it does not. In the case referred to, plaintiff's petition in the trial court averred an untenable basis of recovery, defendant's general demurrer was sustained, plaintiff refused to amend, and the suit was consequently dismissed. On appeal the Court of. Civil Appeals reversed, because in its opinion the petition stated a cause of action. The Supreme Court held that the sustaining of a general demurrer was error, under Rule 90, but that it could not reverse the judgment of the district court for such error "because the appellant presented this case to the Court of Civil Appeals on assignments that confined that court to law questions which test the sufficiency of the petition in the district court as against a general demurrer" and because the petition showed that there was no cause of action; and it accordingly reversed judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirmed that of the district court. Motion for rehearing was overruled.
Rule 90 requires that general demurrers shall not be used but that in contested litigation all faults of pleading are waived unless specifically pointed out. A want of cause of action or the failure to state one may be raised but if so, it must be raised specifically in order that the court and also the pleader may proceed with notice of the fault and that amendment may be effected. Rules 90 and 66.
If a general demurrer is urged, the court at the instance of the opposite party or on its own motion should not sustain it but should strike or overrule it or require it to be reworded. Rules 68, 90. By sustaining the general demurrer the trial court therefore commits error. The question then arises whether the error is reversible.
The court in the present decision answers in the negative, apparently because the appellant did not, on appeal, assign error or, complain as to the improper act of the trial court in considering and sustaining a general demurrer. But the opinion impliedly shows that the court was still more persuaded by the conviction that the case was considered in the manner in which the parties desired and that a correct result was reached.
In the state of the record it would seem that by a general demurrer defendant obtained all of the advantage that he would have got from a special one; his demurrer was sustained; and it would seem that the plaintiff waived any objection to the generality of the demurrer by failing to point out that a general demurrer should not be used and by standing on his petition when the general demurrer was sustained. Rule 90.
The defect in appellate procedure above referred to lay in appellant's failure to assign as error the action of the trial court in considering a general demurrer when a special demurrer should have been used. In most judge-tried cases, including any case tried solely on demurrer, the assignment of error is the "point" in the brief. Rules 374, 418. If there was no such point or no sufficient point in the present case and the appellant had asked leave in the Court of Civil Appeals to supply one, or if the appellate disposition had been based upon his omission or fault in briefing, leave to amend in that respect should have been granted before final disposition in such court. Rules 431, 437. But as the Supreme Court says, " ... an examination of plaintiff's brief in the Court of Civil Appeals discloses that he plants himself squarely on the proposition that as a matter of law" the case he alleged was recoverable, when it was not. So that amendment of the brief would have done the plaintiff no more good than amendment of his petition in the first instance. That is, none.
And finally, the ruling of the trial court, for that reason, was not one that was calculated to cause an improper judgment, and for that reason there should have been no reversal on account of it. Rules 434 and 503.
The case, from a procedural standpoint, may be summarized by an illustration. Suppose plaintiff should represent to the trial court and again to the Court of Civil Appeals that his petition showed all he could allege or prove and that he desired to stake his recovery upon it, and suppose those courts should be of the opinion that no recovery could be had in a case of that character whether amendment was had or not. The duty of the courts in such a situation would seem to be no plainer than was the duty of the Supreme Court in the present instance.
The decision, we believe, enforces two underlying principles of the rules: that the trial court should reach the merits of the case before it and that the appellate court should reach the merits of the appeal.
7 Tex. B.J. 44 (1944) reprinted in 8 Tex. B.J. 41 (1945).
(No. 116) Question: In Bednarz v. State, 142 Tex. 138, 176 S.W. 2d 562 (1943), the judgment of the trial court which was largely in favor of defendant was affirmed, notwithstanding that the defendant filed no answer whatever, and the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, State v. Bednarz, 174 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1943), which reached a contrary result, was accordingly reversed. Does the decision of the Supreme Court make a written answer immaterial?
Answer: No. In any case where such an omission occurs, the plaintiff, if he so desires, may o n default day or thereafter until the time o f trial, claim and have a judgment by default, or he may call upon the court by proper procedure to require an answer to be filed and in this way avail himself of the acknowledged virtues of written pleading in preventing surprise and delineating issues. Rules 90, 91, 268, 274 and see Rule 66.
But if, as in the instant case and in many cases where the fact issues are not complicated, the plaintiff takes no such step but is content to try the matter without an answer, he may do so, and in that event he has no ground to complain. See Rule 67, which sources in Federal Rule 15 (b). That this principle in Texas long antedated the Federal Rules is shown by numerous decisions cited in the opinion in this Bednarz case.
It is contrary to the policy of this subcommittee to express opinions upon pending litigation. The case at hand is not in that class, however, as motion for rehearing has been overruled.
7 Tex. B.J. 80 (1944) reprinted in 8 Tex. B.J. 43 (1945).
Question: "In construing Rule 63 and Rule 166 would an order under Rule 166, on the pre-trial of the case, to the effect that such pre-trial was the beginning of the trial and that no amendment would be permitted thereafter without permission of the court, conflict with the provisions of Rule 63, which provides that amendments may be made without leave of the court prior to seven days before the trial of the case?"
Answer: It is the opinion of the Committee that such an order would be in conflict with Rule 63, and that the pre-trial procedure does not fix the date of the beginning of the trial, and a party would have the right to file amended pleadings up until seven days prior to the actual trial. When Rule 63 is read in connection with Rule 66, permitting trial amendments, it appears clear that it is the spirit of the rules that there should be little, if any, stricture imposed upon the filing of amendments. Rule 166 is limited to preliminary matters and is not intended to fix a date to be taken as the actual beginning of the trial of the case.
11 Tex. B.J. 276 (1948).