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Rule 114. Citation by Publication; Requisites (Dec1941)
Where citation by publication is authorized by these rules, the citation shall contain the requisites prescribed by Rules 15 and 101, in so far as they are not inconsistent herewith, provided that no copy of the plaintiff's petition shall accompany this citation and that the last sentence of Rule 101 shall not here apply, and shall be styled "The State of Texas" and shall be directed to the defendant or defendants by name, if their names are known, or to the defendant or defendants as designated in the petition, if unknown, or such other classification as may be fixed by any statute or by these rules. Where there are two or more defendants or classes of defendants to be served by publication, the citation may be directed to all of them by name and classification, so that service may be completed by publication of the one citation for the required number of times. The citation shall contain the names of the parties, a brief statement of the nature of the suit (which need not contain the details and particulars of the claim), a description of any property involved and of the interest of the named or unknown defendant or defendants, and, where the suit involves land, the requisites of Rule 115. If issued from the district or county court, the citation shall command such parties to appear and answer at or before 10 o'clock a. m. of the first Monday after the expiration of 42 days from the date of issuance thereof, specifying the day of the week, the day of the month, and the time of day the defendant is required to answer. If issued from the justice of the peace court, such citation shall command such parties to appear and answer on or before the first day of the first term of court which convenes after the expiration of 42 days from the date of issue thereof, specifying the day of the week, and the day of the month, that such term will meet.
Amended by order of Sept. 20, 1941, eff. Dec. 31, 1941: The following words have been interpolated in the first sentence: "shall contain the requisites prescribed by Rules 15 and 101, in so far as they are not inconsistent herewith, provided that no copy of the plaintiff's petition shall accompany this citation and that the last sentence of Rule 101 shall not here apply, and".
|Prior Amendments||Future Amendments|
|Oct. 29, 1940, eff. Sept. 1, 1941||Dec. 16, 1987, eff. Jan. 1, 1988|
(No. 28) Question: Should a citation by publication contain the direction that if it is not served within ninety days from the date of issuance, it shall be returned unserved as provided in Rule 101?
Answer: Yes. Rule 114 provides that where citation by publication is authorized it "shall contain the requisites prescribed by Rules 15 and 101 insofar as they are not inconsistent herewith." One of the requisites of an ordinary citation prescribed by Rule 101 is the following:
"The citation shall further direct that if it is not served within ninety (90) days after date of issuance, it shall be returned unserved."
It is not inconsistent with requirements of Rule 114 to incorporate this requisite of an ordinary citation in the citation by publication and it should, therefore, be included.
5 Tex. B.J. 169 (1942) reprinted in 8 Tex. B.J. 13 (1945).
(No. 38) Question: In tax suits is citation by publication controlled by Rules of Civil Procedure 114-116 or by the Statutes?
Answer: Article 7345b, Section 3 (d) specifically states the requisites of a citation which is to be made by publication in tax suits, and this article of the statute also specifically states the manner in which such a citation shall be served by publication and states that the defendant shall be cited to appear on the first day of the next term of court. By virtue of the last sentence of Rule 2, and also by virtue of Rule 110, this article of the statute is continued in effect; and inasmuch as this statute expressly provides for the requisites of such a citation and service differing from the provisions of the Rules it follows that under Rule 110 this statutory procedure for citation by publication in tax suits supersedes the general Rules on the subject of citation by publication. Therefore citations by publication in such cases should be returnable to the next term of court and should otherwise conform to the provisions of Article 7345b, Section 3(d).
However, we call attention to Section 13 of Article 7345b which states that:
"The provisions of this Act shall be cumulative of and in addition to all other rights and remedies to which any taxing unit may be entitled, but as to any particular proceeding brought under this Act, if any part or portion of this Act be in conflict with any part or portion of any law of the State, the terms and provisions of this Act shall govern as to such proceeding. "
It might be held under Subsection 13 that the method of citation by publication provided by Section 3(d) is cumulative of the method provided by Rules 114-116, and that either method is now permissible. However, this involves a construction of the meaning of the statute rather than a construction of the Rules, and it is not within the province of this Subcommittee to pass on such a matter.
5 Tex. B.J. 171 (1942) reprinted in 8 Tex. B.J. 17 (1945).
(No. 82) Question: Rule 107 provides, in part: "No default judgment shall be granted in any cause until the citation, with the officer's return thereon, shall have been on file with the clerk of the court ten days, exclusive of the filing and the day of judgment." Is this requirement applicable to a citation by publication? Can the court appoint an attorney to represent the defendant before appearance day?
Answer: We are of the opinion that the questions should be answered in the negative. The requisites of a citation by publication are prescribed by Rule 114, the form thereof in actions involving land by Rule 115, the service thereof by Rule 116 and the return by Rule 117. These rules specifically prescribe the procedure with respect to citations by publication and Rule 107 dealing with citations in general is not applicable.
There can be no default judgment when the citation is made by publication. Under Rule 244 "if no answer has been filed nor appearance entered within the prescribed time, the court shall appoint an attorney to defend the suit in behalf of the defendant and judgment shall be rendered as in other cases."
We are of the opinion also that no attorney can be appointed until appearance day which is fixed by Rule 114 (and is required to he set forth in the citation) "at or before 10 o'clock a.m . of the first Monday after the expiration of 42 days from the date of issuance thereof, specifying the day of the week, the day of the month, and the time of day the defendant is required to answer."
The sheriff should make his return promptly after the last publication but the court should make certain that the citation has been published once each week for four (4) consecutive weeks "the first publication to be at least twenty-eight (28) days before the return day of the citation" before appointing an attorney to represent the defendant who has not otherwise made an appearance on the days he is required to appear.
6 Tex. B.J. 20 (1943) reprinted in 8 Tex. B.J. 31 (1945).
(No. 115) Question: Rule 114 relating to citation by publication provides that the citation shall contain the requisites prescribed by Rules 15 and 101, provided no copy of the plaintiff's petition shall accompany the citation and that the citation "shall be directed to the defendant or defendants by name." The rule further provides that the citation, among other things, "shall contain the names of the parties." Is it necessary that the names of the defendants be stated twice in the citation, i.e. (1) In the direction of the citation and (2) in stating the names of the parties to the suit?
Answer: We are of opinion that it is unnecessary that the names of the defendants be stated twice in the citation, assuming that all the defendants are cited by publication. All parts of the, citation must be construed together. The portion of the citation indicating the names of the defendants to whom the writ is directed, is a part of the citation. Since a citation by publication is not accompanied by a copy of the plaintiff’s petition as is required in the case of citation in general, which petition discloses the names of the parties, the requirement of Rule 114 that the names of the parties be stated is designed to appraise the defendants not only as to who the plaintiffs are but also who the co-defendants are. No good purpose can be served by requiring that the names of the defendants be stated twice in the citation.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that a citation by publication directed to the defendants by name and which elsewhere in the body of the citation sets forth the names of the plaintiffs followed by the statement, in substance, that the defendants are those persons first named in the writ and to whom it is directed, complies with the requirements of Rule 114.
If there are other defendants, who are personally served, their names, of course, should appear in stating the names of the defendants by adding after the words “to whom it is directed,” as used in the preceding paragraph, some such wording as the following: “and (naming such other defendants) who are being (or have been) personally served with citation (or in any different manner authorized by law other than by publication).”
7 Tex. B.J. 44 (1944) reprinted in 8 Tex. B.J. 42 (1945).
(No. 122) Question: The sheriff's return to a citation by publication, to which was attached a copy of the publication and the affidavit of the publisher as to the dates of publication, disclosed that it was published once each week for four consecutive weeks. The sheriff returned the citation to the clerk where it was filed less than twenty-eight days from the date of first publication, but within forty days of its issuance. Is the service good or is it void because the sheriff did not hold the citation in his possession for twenty-eight days after first publication excluding the day of the publication and the day it was returned to the clerk's office?
Answer: We think the service is valid. A citation by publication issued from the district or county court shall command the defendants to appear and answer at or before ten o'clock of the first Monday morning after the expiration of forty-two days from the date of issuance thereof, specifying the day of the week, the day of the month and the time of day the defendant is required to answer (Rule 114). Rule 116 provides that citation by publication shall be served by the sheriff or any constable of any county of the state by having it published once each week for four consecutive weeks, the first day of publication to be at least twenty-eight days before the return day of the citation. We are of the opinion that the phrase "the return day of the citation," as used in Rule 116, refers to the day the defendants are required by the citation to appear and answer under Rule 114 and not to the day the sheriff actually returns the process to the clerk. The intent of the rule is that the defendant shall have at least twenty-eight full days after the first publication before he is required to answer. The fact that the sheriff may have actually returned the process to the clerk before the expiration of twenty-eight days from the date of first publication is of no materiality here, since it appears that the first date of publication was more than twenty-eight full days before the day the defendant was commanded to appear and answer and that is the essential thing required by the rules.
We call attention to Rule 118 which permits "any process or proof of service to be amended" in the discretion of the court. Even if there were substance in the point raised the court ought not to hold the citation and return void but should direct that the return be amended and the clerk's file mark changed to show that it was filed after the expiration of twenty-eight days. However, nothing of the sort is required in the circumstances stated. We call attention to the rule permitting amendments to process and return merely to bring to the fore the concept of the rules that form shall not be allowed to control the substance of things unless imperatively required in the interest of justice.
7 Tex. B.J. 118 (1944) reprinted in 8 Tex. B.J. 45 (1945).
(No. 126) Question: The opinion of the subcommittee appearing as No. 122 at 7 Tex. B.J. 118, expresses the view that where a citation has been published, as required by Rule 116, "once each week for four consecutive weeks," with "the first publication ... at least twenty-eight days before the return day of the citation," and where the officer's return is made after the last publication and shows the total publication required by the rule, judgment is not erroneous by reason of the mere fact that such return is filed before the expiration of the twenty-eight days. Is this opinion correct in view of O’Connor v. Towns, 1 Tex. 107 (1846); Wagner v. Urban, 170 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1943); and Daniel Miller Co. v. Puett, 252 S.W. 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1923)?
Answer: The cited cases, as we read them, involved situations in which it appeared that there had been insufficient service or in which the returns failed to show sufficient service. In the case last cited, one of the reasons why the return failed in this respect was that it was made within fourteen days after the writ was issued and therefore did and could not show the four publications. It was in this connection that the court said, as a reason for its decision, that the return was filed “before the full twenty-eight days for publication were up."
The fact situation assumed in the question at hand is different. The four consecutive publications could be shown in the return and were so shown, and the judgment ensued after the full time required by Rule 114.
As we read the rules, no requirement is made that the officer's return shall be made on or after the full twenty-eight days elapse. The requirement in this respect is only that the return show the four publications, etc. Rule 117. The return would consequently have to be made subsequently to the fourth publication, but, in our opinion, it would not have to be delayed further. As we observed in the previous opinion, when Rule 116 calls for the twenty-eight days' service before "return day," it does not refer to the day upon which the officer's return is actually made. See R. S. Arts. 2036 and 2039, similar words in all the preceding revised statutes, and 37 Words and Phrases 548.
7 Tex. B.J. 281 (1944) reprinted in 8 Tex. B.J. 47 (1945).
(No. 133) Question: Rule 114 provides that a Citation by Publication shall contain "a brief statement of the nature of the suit (which need not contain the details and particulars of the claim) ... " In view of this rule is it sufficient for the Citation by Publication in a divorce case to state that it is a "suit for divorce"; or should the Citation by Publication go further and give in general terms the grounds for divorce as alleged in the petition?
Answer: In our opinion the Citation by Publication is sufficient when it states the nature of the suit as a "suit for divorce." In arriving at this conclusion we assume that the suit is solely for divorce, and that it does not involve the custody of children or property rights, etc.
Before the adoption of the Rules, Article 2039 required Citation by Publication to "contain a brief statement of the cause of action," and Article 2041 provided that "it need not contain the details and particulars of the cause of action." These Statutes were repealed, and Rule 114 which supplants them now only requires "a brief statement of the nature of the suit (which need not contain the details and particulars of the claim)." We feel that the nature of the suit is adequately stated when it is referred to as a suit for divorce. The new Rule does not require a brief statement of the cause of action, nor does it require a brief statement of the claim. Insofar as applicable to the question at hand, it merely requires a statement of the nature of the suit.
The purpose of a Citation by Publication in a divorce action is to inform the defendant that such action is pending (Morehouse v. Morehouse, 111 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1937)). It is true that by reading the Citation by Publication the defendant would not ascertain the grounds upon which the divorce was sought; but the defendant would be given full notice of the filing of the suit and the fact that it was a suit for divorce, and the defendant would be given full information as to where the suit was pending so that the details and particulars of the claim could easily be ascertained. This conclusion gives effect to the change which the Rule made in the repealed Statutes.
7 Tex. B.J. 327 (1944) reprinted in 8 Tex. B.J. 51 (1945).
Question: Where citation by publication is issued under Article 3592 in an action to declare heirship instituted under the provisions of Chapter 23, Title 54, relating to Estates of Decedents, should the citation be published in the manner and for the number of times specified in Rule of Civil Procedure 116, or should the citation be published as provided for in Articles 3310a and 3311 which regulate citations in all probate matters?
Answer: In our opinion a citation by publication in such an action to declare heirship should be published in accordance with the provisions of Articles 3310a and 3311. Rule of Civil Procedure 116 regulating service of citation by publication in ordinary civil suits has no application to probate matters.
Rule 2 expressly provides "Where any statute in effect immediately prior to September 1, 1941, prescribed a rule of procedure in lunacy, guardianship, or estates of decedents, or any other probate proceedings in the county court differing from these rules, and not included in the 'List of Repealed Statutes,' such statute shall apply." Articles 3310a, 3311 and Articles 3590-3592 were not listed as repealed, and therefore under the provisions of Rule 2 said Articles remain in full force and effect and govern the manner in which citation is served in all probate proceedings in the county court.
8 Tex. B.J. 219 (1945).
Question: Citation by publication issued by the District Clerk on August 28, 1945, commanded the defendant to appear and answer "at or before 10 o'clock A. M. of the first Monday after the expiration of forty-two days from the date of issuance hereof, the same being September 24th, 1945." This date was an error and should have read October 15th, 1945. The citation was published on September 7th, September 14th, September 21st, and September 28th, 1945.
Is the Citation and service thereunder good after October 15th, 1945; or does the error of the Clerk in inserting September 24th instead of October 15th, 1945, nullify the citation and the service thereunder?
Answer: Rule 114 relating to the requisites of Citation by Publication states, among other things: "If issued from the District Court or County Court the citation shall command such parties to appear and answer at or before 10 o'clock A. M. of the first Monday after the expiration of 42 days from the date of issuance thereof, specifying the day of the week, the day of the month, and the time of day the defendant is required to answer."
The Rule contemplates and requires that the citation not only command the defendant to appear at or before 10 o'clock A. M. of the first Monday after the expiration of 42 days from the date of issuance, but that it also specify the day of the week and the day of the month and the time of day the defendant is required to answer. The day of the month, and even the month, specified by the citation in the above illustration was incorrect, and therefore the citation was obviously defective. Although the citation showed on its face that it contained an error, that fact would not necessarily render the error immaterial, because the defendant reading the citation would not know whether the error was made in the date of issuance of the citation or in the date inserted as the day upon which he should answer. Therefore, as the citation stands in such defective condition, the Sub-committee is of the opinion that it would not constitute legal service.
This opinion does not undertake to pass upon the question of whether the citation could be amended under Rule 118 under circumstances indicated above.
8 Tex. B.J. 559 (1945).
Questions: In a condemnation suit under Article 3264, where the residence of the defendant is unknown and it is necessary to obtain citation by publication, the following questions are presented:
1. Does Section 8 of Article 3264 authorize service by the posting of the notice or citation, when construed in connection with Article 29 (a), Section 5?
2. Does Rule 647 authorize service of citation in such a proceeding by posting instead of by publication?
3. Do Rules 114 to 117, inclusive, authorize the posting of citation for 28 days in lieu of publication, should there be a refusal on the part of one newspaper in an adjoining county to publish the citation at the statutory rates?
Answers: Question number 1 solely involves a construction of Statutes as distinguished from the Rules of Procedure, and therefore the Subcommittee does not feel that it is within its province to answer said question. Whether Article 3264 is so worded as to invoke the provisions of Article 29 (a) is not a matter over which this Subcommittee should undertake to express an opinion. However, the provisions of Article 3264, Section 8, expressly state that "Such notice may be served by publication in the manner provided for such service of citation by publication in other civil cases in the district or county court," and therefore the Subcommittee is of the opinion that citation by publication may be served in such a situation in the manner provided for by Rules 114 to 117.
In answer to question No.2, the Subcommittee is of the opinion that Rule 647 is not applicable to citation by publication nor to the notice provided for by Article 3264 in condemnation proceedings because such notice is in the nature of a citation. Therefore, we answer the second question in the negative.
We answer Question No.3 in the negative. Rules 114 to 117 provide solely for the service of citation by publication, and they do not make any provision for serving such citation by posting. If one newspaper in an adjoining county refuses to publish the citation at the statutory rates resort should be had to another newspaper to make the publication of the citation.
9 Tex. B.J. 262 (1946).